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1. INTRODUCTION

A. Subverting the Rule of Law
This Article contextualizes the Senate debates leading to the passage
of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA) 2 within broader American
cultural narratives about the law and lawyers' roles in society. The DTA
was Congress's first real attempt to help shape the legal regime that serves
as a foundation to the "global war on terrorism," which to many represents
an inversion of traditional American values of law and justice.3 The DTA's
provisions stripped federal courts of jurisdiction to hear writs of habeas

2. Detainee Treatment Act of2005 (DTA), Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739, Pub. L. No.
109-163, 119 Stat. 3474 [hereinafter DTA] (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000dd,
2000dd-I (West 2007) and 10 U.S.C.A. § 801 (West 2007)).
3. See, e.g., Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, DecidingGuilt: Trying the
Military Tribunals,111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1263-66 (2002) (arguing that the November 2001 Military
Order's "vagueness invites arbitrary and potentially discriminatory determinations" and "installs
the executive branch as lawgiver as well as law-enforcer, law-interpreter, and law-applier" and thus
"authorize[s] a decisive departure from the legal status quo.").
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corpus from "unlawful enemy combatants'" imprisoned in the U.S.
military prison at Guantinamo Bay, Cuba. Congress passed the DTA in
response to the U.S. Supreme Court's 2004 decision in Rasul v. Bush,
which provided that federal courts have jurisdiction over habeas corpus
challenges to the "legality of the Executive's potentially indefinite
detention of individuals who claim to be wholly innocent of wrongdoing." 5
As it turned out, Rasul and the DTA were only the beginning of the
continuing legal odyssey of the "unlawful enemy combatants" at
Guantdnamo. In 2006, the Court ruled the DTA's jurisdiction-stripping
provisions unconstitutional in Hamdanv. Rumsfeld.6 In response, Congress
reasserted itself by passing the Military Commissions Act of 2006
(MCA). 7 The D.C. Circuit decided not to analyze the constitutionality of
the MCA by refusing to review recent cases involving detainees.8 The U.S.
Supreme Court twice refused to review the D.C. Circuit's stance, 9 and in
April 2007, rejected an attempt by Salim Ahmed Hamdan, the plaintiff in
Hamdan, to bypass the D.C. Circuit.'" Then, in an unexpected turn of

4. 10 U.S.C. § 948a(1) (2006) (defining "unlawful enemy combatant").
5. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 485 (2004) (per Stevens, J., for the Court, with whom
Kennedy, J., concurred. Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
6. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
7. Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA), Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600
[hereinafter MCA] (codified in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.).
8. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 984 (discussing cases in which courts dismissed
detainees' claims); but see id. at 995 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (stating "[t]he MCA ... is void and
does not deprive this court or the district courts ofjurisdiction.").
9. Amy Goldstein, Justices Again Refuse Guantcinamo Bay Cases, WASH. POST, May 1,
2007, at A04. On April 2, the Court refused to review the February 20 decision of the D.C. Circuit
Court upholding the MCA's habeas-stripping provisions. Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 3078
(2007); Al Odah v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 3067 (2007). These appeals sought to challenge only
the loss of habeas corpus; they did not challenge the constitutionality of the DTA or the MCA
process. The Court did not specify reasons, but Justices Stevens and Kennedy wrote separately that
though they were bound by the "exhaustion-of-remedies" doctrine, this doctrine did not demand
exhaustion of "inadequate" remedies, and thus, if the petitioners found the government to be
"unreasonably" delaying the DTA process, perpetrating some "other and ongoing injury," or
"prejudicing" the petitioners in other ways, the Court would reconsider its review under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 165 1(a), 2241. Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 1478, 1479 (2007). These detainees have since
petitioned the circuit court to rehear the denial of their cases, but not to act on those petitions until
completion of the circuit court's review of the cases under the DTA process. See Boumediene, 127
S. Ct. at 3078; see also Al Odah, 127 S. Ct. at 3067.
10. The Court on April 30 again refused to review the circuit court's upholding of the MCA
habeas-stripping provisions, and refused to hear Salim Ahmed Hamdan's challenge of his trial
before a military commission established by the MCA. Hamdan v. Gates, 127 S. Ct. 2133, 2133
(2007). There is no pending petition for rehearing of that denial, sending the case back to the D.C.
Circuit.
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events, on the final day of the term, the Court vacated its earlier decisions
in Boumediene v. Bush and Al Odah v. United States, consolidated cases
of dozens of prisoners who sought a writ of habeas corpus after they were
detained as enemy combatants at Guantdnamo Bay." This may have been
the first such reversal since 1968.2 The Court has also considered an
original habeas corpus petition that challenges the MCA. 3
Several other cases in the D.C. and other appellate courts may wind
their way to the U.S. Supreme Court. 14 Congress passed bills in both
houses which reconsider the MCA's ban on habeas challenges; however,
as of October 2007, the bills were still in committee discussions.'" There
was also an attempt to write in habeas restoration provisions in a defense
spending bill, but the House Armed Services Committee refused to do so
in May 2007.16 Finally, other bills have been introduced to shutdown
Guantdnamo Bay altogether, which would result in the remaining detainee
population's transfer to either civilian or military courts in the United
States. "

11. Al Odah v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 3067 (2007); Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 3078
(2007).
12. See Kolod v. United States, 390 U.S. 136 (1968); see also Lyle Denniston, Court
Switches, Will Hear Detainee Cases, Scotusblog.com (June 29,2007), http://www.scotusblog.com/
movabletype/archives/2007/06/court_1 .html.
13. See, e.g., In re Ali, 127 S. Ct. 3037 (2007) (determining whether the court retains
jurisdiction over a habeas plea post-MCA).
14. See, e.g., AI-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 2007). The court found Al-Marri to
be a civilian, and not an enemy combatant, and held, therefore, that the MCA does not apply to
him. Id. at 174. Accordingly, federal courts retain jurisdiction to consider his habeas petition and
should grant him relief under that writ. Id. at 168-74. For an overview of the current litigation, see
Lyle Denniston, Primer on Detainees' Status Now-Part I, Scotusblog.com (May 12, 2007),
http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/ 2007/05/primer on detai.html; Lyle Denniston,
Primer on Detainees' Status Now-Part II, Scotusblog.com (May 13, 2007), http://www.
scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/2007/05/primter-on-deta.html.
15. Habeas Corpus Restoration Act of 2007, H.R. 1416, 110th Cong. (2007) (in committee
review by House Armed Services and Judiciary Committees); Habeas Corpus Preservation Act,
H.R. 1189, 110th Cong. (2007) (in review by House Armed Services, Judiciary, and Foreign Affairs
Committees); Military Commissions Habeas Corpus Restoration Act, H.R. 267, 110th Cong. (2007)
(in review by House Judiciary Committee); Habeas Corpus Restoration Act of 2007, S. 185, 110th
Cong. (2007) (scheduled for debate in the Senate Judiciary Committee).
16. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, H.R. 1585, 110th Cong.
(2007).
17. To require the President to close the Department of Defense detention facility at
Guant.namo Bay, Cuba, and for other purposes, H.R. 2212, 110th Cong. (2007) (in review by
House Armed Services Committee); A bill to require the President to close the Department of
Defense detention facility at Guantinamo Bay, Cuba, and for other purposes, S. 1249, 110th Cong.
(2007) (in review by Housed Armed Services Committee).
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Many legal commentators 8 and others, including the International
Committee of the Red Cross 9 and independent experts with mandates
from the U.N. Human Rights Commission,2" have criticized the practices
at Guantfinamo for failing to meet standards of treatment under
international humanitarian law, while others have seized upon
GuantAnamo as a perfect illustration of ajuridical phenomenon that Italian
political philosopher Giorgio Agamben, has termed a "state of
exception."'" As others have noted, Guantinamo is but one of all too many
ready examples of how the Bush Administration has inverted the very
meaning of the rule of law in the post-9/1 1 world.22 This perversion of the
18. See, e.g., Katyal & Tribe, supra note 3, at 1259. See also Diane Marie Amann,
Guanttinamo, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 263,286, 329, 347 (2004) (characterizing the military
commissions at Guantdnamo Bay as "tribunals of exception" and arguing that the central premise
of U.S. executive policy is that Guanthnamo is "a space within which no rule of law obtains.");
James Theo Gathii, Torture,Extraterritoriality,Terrorism,andInternationalLaw,67 ALB. L. REV.
335, 368 (2003) (condemning the notion of"territoriality" used by U.S. appellate courts as "simply
a fagade for an anti-alien prejudice" and describing Guantinamo Bay as an example of "the rule
of law [having been] suspended"). But see Fleur Johns, Guantdnamo Bay and the Annihilation of
the Exception, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 613, 614 (2005) (arguing against such views, and in a particular
reading of Carl Schmitt, contending that "the plight of the Guantinamo Bay detainees is less an
outcome of law's suspension or evisceration than of elaborate regulatory efforts by a range of legal
authorities," and characterizing the Guantunamo military prisons as "spaces where law and liberal
proceduralism speak and operate in excess.").
19. See Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Guantanamo Bay: Overview of the ICRC's workfor
theInternees,Jan. 30, 2004, http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/5qrc5v?opendocum
ent (stating "the U.S. authorities have placed the internees beyond the law.").
20. See Comm'n on Human Rights: Indep. Experts Issue Report on Guantfnamo Detainees,
U.N. NEWS CENTRE (Feb. 16, 2006) (quoting the press release issued by the experts with the
announcement of the report as stating that "[terrorism suspects should be detained in accordance
with criminal procedure that respects the safeguards enshrined in relevant international law .. "),
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewslD=17523&Cr-- Guantanamo&Crl=Bay; see also
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Human Rights, Econ. Soc. & Cult. Rights, Civil & Pol.
Rights, Situation of Detainees at Guantdnamo Bay, U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/2006/120 (Feb. 15, 2006),
http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/chr/docs/62chr/E.CN.4.2006.120_.pdf.
21. See GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION (Kevin Attell trans., U. Chi. Press 2005)
(2003) (applying notion of "state of exception" to the Military Order of November 2001, which
authorized the indefinite detention and trial of alleged enemy combatants at Guanthnamo Bay); see
also GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE 36-37, 166-80 (Daniel
Heller-Roazen trans., Stan. U. Press 1998) (1995) (describing "the camp"--an emblematic state
of exception-as the nomos of modem political existence).
22. See SEYMOUR M. HERSCH, CHAIN OF COMMAND: THE ROAD FROM 9/11 TO ABU GHRAIB
(2004); MARK DANNER, TORTURE AND TRUTH: AMERICA, ABU GHRAm, AND THE WAR ON TERROR
(2004); STEPHEN GREY, GHOST PLANE: THE TRUE STORY OF THE CIA TORTURE PROGRAM (2006)
[hereinafter GREY, GHOST PLANE]; DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2003). The Bush Administration's
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rule of law has come hand in hand with a radical reinterpretation of the
powers of the Executive, which is a continuation of a struggle between the
branches that has been particularly acute over the last two decades.2 3 As
law professor David Cole points out, the extreme "flexibility" displayed
in deciphering the constraints imposed by our own U.S. Constitution and
the international treaties the United States has signed and ratified has
law was on our side into one in
"turned a world in which international
24
which we see it as our enemy.,
This observation, unfortunately, is not a hyperbolic one. One need look
no further than the Pentagon's National Defense Strategy, issued in March
2005, which states, "[o]ur strength as a nation state will continue to be
challenged by those who employ a strategy of the weak, using
international fora, judicial process, and terrorism. ,25 As Cole reflects,
"something has gone perilously wrong" when "[t]he proposition that
judicial processes-the very essence of the rule of law-are to be
dismissed as a strategy of the weak, akin to terrorism ..... and "[w]hen
the rule of law is seen simply as a device used by terrorists ....

domestic spying program, run by the National Security Agency (NSA), offers another such
subversion of the rule of law. See infra note 280.
23. See Cass R. Sunstein, Monkey Wrench, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Sept.-Oct. 2005, at 36-40,
availableat www.legalaffairs.org/ issues/September-October-2005/feature_sunstein_sepoct05.msp
(arguing against an understanding of the U.S. Constitution ascendant post-9/1 Ithat Sunstein calls
"national security fundamentalism," whose subscribers "understand the Constitution to say that
when national security is genuinely threatened, the president must be permitted to do whatever
needs to be done to protect the United States."). See also Dahlia Lithwick, The ImperialPresidency,
WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 2007, at B02. This rise of the "unitary executive" may really have been the
rise of the "Shadow Unitary Executive" in the form of the ascendancy of the Vice President, who
by most accounts has orchestrated this radical re-empowerment of the executive branch. See Marty
Lederman, Addington Speaks!, BALKANIZATION (June 26,2007), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2007/
06/addington-speaks.html. It was eventually revealed that Vice President Cheney brought into the
Oval Office the four-page executive order in which the President originally designated terrorism
suspects as enemy combatants for the President's signature on November 13, 2001. The Vice
President's office purposefully hid the details of the order and the fact that the President was to sign
the order from the National Security Advisor, Condaleeza Rice, and the Secretary of State, Colin
Powell. See Sidney Blumenthal, The Imperial Vice Presidency, SALON.COM (June 28, 2007),
http://www.salon.com/opinion/blumenthal/2007/06/28/cheney/index. html; Barton Gellman & Jo
Becker, Angler: The Cheney Vice Presidency, WASH. POST, http://blog.washingtonpost.com/
cheney/?hpid=specialreports (last visited Sept. 25, 2007).
24. David Cole, hat Bush Wants to Hear,52 N.Y. REV. BOOKS 18, 8-11, Nov. 17, 2005
(reviewing JOHN Yoo, THE POWER OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTrrIUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AFTER 9/11 (2005)).
25. Id. at 11 (quoting the Nat'l Defense Strategy, Mar. 2005).
26. Id.
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This Article will explore how the law and its agents, lawyers, gradually
have been transformed in the popular imagination into enemy
combatants---destabilizing forces within our society. As will be shown, the
rhetoric and cultural narratives surrounding the "War on Terrorism" and
its legal regime are far from exceptional within the American cultural
engagement with the law. Rather, they draw strength from and help
perpetuate a long-standing ideological "jaundiced view"27 of the law and
lawyers that has been used to great effect in further marginalizing
"undesirable" groups in our society by restricting access to justice,
procedural rights, and the scope ofjudicial discretion. Understanding this
genealogy helps contextualize not only the ascendancy of the view of the
law and lawyers as enemy combatants, but also reinforces how such
cultural pathologies threaten everyone's freedom. Before proceeding,
however, a brief consideration of the evasive figure of the unlawful enemy
combatant is in order.
B. The Image of the "Unlawful'"Enemy Combatant
The image of the enemy combatant first appeared in constitutional
culture in Exparte Quirin.2 8 The Court in Quirin was confronted with six
German saboteurs caught entering the United States during World War
11.29 It classified the Germans as "unlawful" enemy combatants, which it
defined as "those who[,] during time of war, pass surreptitiously from
enemy territory into our own, discarding their uniforms upon entry, for the
commission of hostile acts involving destruction of life or property...."'0
This definition derives from then extant international humanitarian law,
namely the Hague Convention No. IV,3 which differentiated between
lawful combatants, who deserve the status of prisoners of war upon
capture, and unlawful combatants, who lose such status upon review by
military tribunals that determine the legality or illegality of their activities.
However, the term has little legal meaning as it has been applied in the

27. See Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: ContemporaryLegends About the Civil Justice
System, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 717, 717 (1998) [hereinafter Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell] (defining the
"jaundiced view" as "a set of beliefs and prescriptions about the legal system based on the
perception that people are suing each other indiscriminately about the most frivolous matters, and
juries are capriciously awarding immense sums to undeserving claimants.").
28. Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31 (1942).
29. Id. at 21-23.
30. Id. at 35.
31. Id. at 30 n.7 (stating that forty-four nations signed Article I of the Annex to the Hague
Convention No. IV of Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2295, that "define[d] the persons to whom belligerent
rights and duties attach .... ").
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"War on Terrorism," to the extent that, outside the international conflicts
in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States is not engaged in armed
conflicts of an international character.32
According to the Court in Quirin, the unlawful enemy combatant acts
as a "spy who secretly and without uniform passes the military lines of a
belligerent in a time of war, seeking to gather military information and
communicate it to the enemy or... [passes] secretly through the lines [to]
wag[e] war by destruction of life or property .... The unlawful enemy
combatant thus distinguishes himself from other combatants in that he
does not look like a combatant, but rather, passes as a civilian. He is
dangerous because he aims to disrupt our way of life not through cannon
shot or aerial bombardment, as in conventional warfare, but by creating
chaos and carnage within our society, debilitating our infrastructure and
forcing us into states of emergency.34 Even when the enemy combatant is
not actively engaged in hostilities, his very presence among us is enough
to engender a paranoia that interrupts the fluid functioning of our daily
affairs.
32. The International Committee for the Red Cross, the guardians of international
humanitarian law, stated the following with respect to the enemy combatant:
The term is currently used-by those who view the "global war against terror" as
an armed conflict in the legal sense-to denote persons believed to belong to, or
believed to be associated with terrorist groups, regardless of the circumstances of
their capture ....From an IHL perspective, the term "combatant" or "enemy
combatant" has no legal meaning outside of armed conflict. To the extent that
persons designated "enemy combatants" have been captured in international or
non-international armed conflict, the provisions and protections of international
humanitarian law remain applicable regardless of how such persons are called.
Similarly, when individuals are captured outside of armed conflict their actions
and protection are governed by domestic law and human rights law, regardless of
how they are called.
Int'l Comm. for the Red Cross, Official Statement: The Relevance of IHL in the Context of
Terrorism,July 21, 2005, http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteengO.nsf/html/terrorism-ihl-210705.
33. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 31.
34. Id. at 31-38. The Bush Administration identified enemy combatants, or "terrorists," as
[i]ndividuals acting alone or in concert involved in international terrorism [who]
possess both the capability and the intention to undertake further terrorist attacks
against the United States that, if not detected and prevented, will cause mass
deaths, mass injuries, and massive destruction of property, and may place at risk
the continuity of the operations of the United States Government.
Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed.
Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001) [hereinafter Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001].
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The Bush Administration and its interlocutors in Congress, have
generated at least some of this paranoia. President Bush's description of
the nation's enemies in his address to ajoint session of Congress nine days
after 9/11 closely-mirrored the image of the enemy combatant.35 He
described our enemies as terrorists who "'hate our freedoms' and want to
'disrupt and end a way of life."' 36 Senator Graham similarly described the
enemy combatant before the Senate:
We find ourselves in a war with a group of people who are not part
of a state or a nation. They do not wear uniforms. They are
terrorists. They hide among civilians. They cheat. They do anything
one can imagine to have their way. They do not abide by any
international regimes.37
In short, enemy combatants do not play by the rules-they undermine
them, threatening to undermine our society in the process.
In trying to understand a part of the cultural processes by which the law
and lawyers, have been turned into enemy combatants, my argument will
draw upon the work of cognitive scientists, such as George Lakoff and
Steven Winter, who have applied these methodologies to politics and law,
respectively.38 These scholars take seriously the notion that there can be no
law or reason without metaphor; in other words, that metaphor is in a real
sense one of the basic elements of the genetic material of our body politic.
Some have responded to this crisis in our national commitment to the
rule of law from a doctrinal perspective,39 and others philosophically,
usually by reference to the philosophy of Agamben and of German jurist
and political theorist Carl Schmitt, who built his political theory on the
necessity of distinguishing between political enemies and friends.4" This

35. Nicholas Lemann, ParanoidStyle: How Conspiracy Theories Become News, NEW
YORKER, Oct. 16, 2006, at 96.
36. Id.
37. 151 CONG. REc. S8811 (daily ed. July 25, 2005) (statement of Sen. Graham).
38. See infra notes 48 & 49.
39. See, e.g., Katyal & Tribe, supra note 3, at 1268, 1284-85 (arguing that Art. I, § 8 of the
Constitution gives Congress the power "[t]o constitute Tribunals inferior to the [S]upreme Court,"
that Congress has not exercised to establish military commissions, and that the President has no
inherent authority to do so under Article II). But see John M. Bickers, Military Commissions are
ConstitutionallySound: A Response to ProfessorsKatyal and Tribe, 34 TEX. TECH L. REv. 899,
918 (2003) (arguing that only wars between sovereigns demand a formal declaration of war).
40. See, e.g., Oren Gross, The Normless andExceptionless Exception: CarlSchmitt's Theory
ofEmergency Powers and the "Norm-Exception "Dichotomy, 21 CARDozO L. REv. 1825 (2000).
The appeal to Schmitt's philosophy in the post-9/11 era is a global phenomenon. See The
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Article, however, will attack the problem from a different perspective:
within the sphere of American culture. It analyzes a particularly productive
few months of Senate hearings in which that body attempted to assert itself
in the stewardship of the "War on Terrorism" through a variety of discrete
legislative proposals. The primary focus will be on Senator Lindsey 0.
Graham's (R.-S.C.) amendment to S.1042, the National Defense
Authorizations Act for Fiscal Year 2006,4" which came to a vote in midNovember 2005 and attempted to alter drastically the procedures of
determining and reviewing enemy combatant status at Guantdnamo Bay.
The President eventually signed a bill that incorporated a version of the
amendment into law on December 30, 2005, as the DTA.42
Though language is frequently the source of legal battles and is
paramount to constitutional and legislative interpretation, the following
analysis will highlight the particularly potent forms of discourse utilized
by Graham and other senators in debating the provisions of the
amendment. Graham's language and framing of the debates draw
heavily-purposively or not-upon prominent cultural tropes about our
justice system and the lawyers within it. These metaphors have pervaded
our national cultural consciousness for decades, influenced by
conservative politicians, think tanks, media outlets and other sources,
including Supreme Courtjustices, presidents, and vice-presidents.43 Iargue
that these Senate debates, and any echoes thereof in "popular culture" and
other fora beyond the intimate circles of legal elites, may prove
foundational in instilling or reinforcing a national attitude towards the
law's role in what has apparently become a "forever war." This is a story
of how the irresponsible deployment of metaphor comes to undermine
public debate on a matter of national importance and how the public
acquiesces to the powers of metaphor, due no doubt in part to the salience
InternationalTheory of Carl Schmitt, 19 LEIDEN J. INT'LL. 1 (2006), availableat http://www.ljil.
leidenuniv.nl/index.php3?c=187 (last visited Sept. 3, 2007) (addressing Schmitt's political
philosophy in a global perspective).
41. Nat'l Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, S. 1042, 109th Cong. (1st Sess.
2005).
42. See DTA, supra note 2.
43. See infra Part II.A.
44. See Mark Danner, The War on Terror:Four Years On, Taking Stock ofthe ForeverWar,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2005, at 6. Danner writes, "[g]rotesque as it is to say, the spectacle of 9/11
was meant to serve, among other things, as an enormous recruiting poster." Id.Danner argues that
the Bush Administration's "War on Terrorism," particularly its decisions to invade Afghanistan and
Iraq, have helped make a reality of Osama bin Laden's prophecies of a seemingly endless
civilizational war between the West and radical Islam (as President Bush remarked five days
following the attacks on 9/11, "This is a new kind of evil and we understand... this crusade, this
war on terrorism, is going to take a while.").
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and diffusion of similar and related metaphors within the collective
consciousness. The force of the metaphor-laden argument enables it to
overpower more impassioned, judicial modes of thought leading to
disastrous results, including the undermining of the rule of law.
This Article proceeds in several stages. Part I provides the theoretical
groundwork to appreciate the contributions of cognitive science towards
our understanding of the power of language and metaphor in our political
process. Part II provides background on the development and proliferation
of the jaundiced view of the law upon which Graham's rhetoric builds. It
traces back to earlier manifestations of similar rhetoric in the tort reform
debates, which portray the law and lawyers as having a dissolutive effect
on society in a variety of ways. We are introduced to the images of the
"conniving claimant" and the "predator lawyer," metaphors that continue
to resonate today in part because the jaundiced view of the law did not
wither away. The rest of Part II follows its journey through other social
and legal contexts, including crime, immigration, and the use of the tort
system to pursue human rights abuse committed abroad.
of law and culture, the elements of the
In these other spheres
' and predator
"conniving claimant"45
lawyer metaphors developed in earlier
parts of the century and broadcast widely by conservatives during the tort
reform debates, have by now diffused more widely. In these other
contexts, the construed threat emerges from activist judges who are
empowered to use their discretion in decisionmaking. In these realms, the
core activity of judges to both hear the cases of marginalized individuals
(jurisdiction) and their power to grant relief within legally defined
parameters (discretion) are fought against as if they are societal diseases
that must be prevented from infecting the body politic.
Part III turns our attention to the "War on Terrorism," focusing on the
legal and political setting in which the Graham Amendment arose. It was
a period in which Congress awoke from a paralyzing fear-induced
legislative slumber and finally took initiative in handling the "War on
Terrorism." Part IV analyzes the rhetoric deployed by Senator Graham in
support of his amendment to the Defense Appropriations Bill of Fiscal
Year 2006-the DTA-demonstrating its linkages to earlier
manifestations of the jaundiced view of the law. Finally, Part V explores
how the entailments of the enemy combatant metaphor have extended well
beyond noncitizens to threaten U.S. citizens and lawyers in particular. The
argument is an attempt to show the continuities between, and the

45. See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
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interdependence of the fates of those designated enemy combatants, and
the rest of us who compose the body politic.
This Article does not emphasize the merits of Graham's Amendment
and other legislative efforts around the "War on Terrorism," though these
will be considered where relevant. Indeed, the methodology presented here
simply seeks to describe how metaphors travel through the law, from one
context to another as they are strategically utilized by various actors within
' In this light, the true import of the Graham
our "constitutional culture."46
Amendment goes far beyond its immediate legal effect; its contribution,
building upon a long-line of antecedent images, is reinforcing a
widespread cultural expectation or sense of normalcy around viewing the
law and lawyers, as debilitating elements in our society.
II. "No LAW OR REASON WITHOUT METAPHOR": UNDERSTANDING
CONCEPTUAL METAPHORS IN POLITICS

Studying culture is increasingly recognized as essential to
understanding human political and social interaction, be it in the sandbox,
in global power relations, or in the law.47 Cognitive science in particular
has introduced important conceptual models and units of analysis through
which we can begin to understand the micro-processes inherent to cultural
interactions. Both Steven Winter"8 and George Lakoff,4 9 two of the most
prominent scholars to ply the trade of cognitive science to the realms of
law and politics, see metaphor as foundational to both law and reason.5"
Winter describes "Idealized Cognitive Models" (ICMs) as the fundamental

46. See Reva B. Siegel, ConstitutionalCulture,SocialMovement Conflictand Constitutional
Change: The Case of the De Facto Era, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323 (2006) (explaining how
"constitutional culture channels social movement conflict to produce enforceable constitutional
understandings.").
47. See Austin Sarat & Jonathan Simon, BeyondLegalRealism?:CulturalAnalysis,Cultural
Studies, and the Situation of Legal Scholarship, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 3, 3 (2001) (stating
"Everywhere it seems that culture is in ascendance."); see also David Brooks, Questionsof Culture,
N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 19, 2006, § 4, at 12 (noting that economics is "no longer the queen of the social
sciences" and that recent history has "thrown us back to the murky realms of theology, sociology,
anthropology and history," with even the economists recognizing this and consequently "migrating
to more behavioralist and cultural approaches.").
48. See generally STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE AND MIND

(2001).
49. See generally GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 81 (2003).

50. See Jonathan Simon, Governing Through Crime Metaphors, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 1035,
1063 (2002).
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cognitive units by which our minds structure our daily experience of the
world, including our understanding of it and interaction with it.5
Some ICMs present scenarios, scripts or what Lakoff calls "experiential
gestalts"52 (Winter provides the example of the "restaurant scenario"--we
reflexively "know" upon entering a restaurant and sitting down that the
waiter is there to take our orders and serve the meal, not to interrogate us
or draw our portraits on his or her pad),53 while other gestalts consist of
broad concepts, ideas, or categories grounded in a physical or cultural
experience, such as the ICM of mother.54 Other ICMs structure themselves
in terms of metaphors, and still others take the form of metonymies, like
racial stereotypes in which characteristics experienced with respect to
some members of a social group are ascribed to all members.55 In short,
ICMs, the metaphors, and the metaphor-making they facilitate, help shape
our reality by providing a basis for our knowledge and ability to act on
different things; they are the building blocks by which humans order their
world and create meaning out of it.
Jonathan Simon brings the cognitive scientists' thinking in line with
Michel Foucault's concept of "governmentality," (a condensation of
"governmental" and "rationalities"), which Foucault uses to argue that the
act of government is "bound up with ways of reasoning about
governing."56 Simon has argued for recognizing what he calls
"governmental metaphors," such as the "war on crime," which he
considers so common that "it is easy to forget that it is a metaphor,
arguably one of the most successful governmental metaphors of the
twentieth century."57 Simon traces how the war metaphor developed after

51. Steven L. Winter, Legal Storytelling: The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Between
Legal Power andNarrative Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2225, 2233 (1989).
52. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 49. Lakoff and Johnson define experiential gestalts as
"ways of organizing experiences into structured wholes," which are characterized by
multidimensional structures that help us to "make[] our experience coherent." Id. at 81. For
example, by imposing the gestalt of a "conversation" on our experience of talking to others,
listening to them talk, "we experience the talking and listening that we engage in as a particular
kind of experience, namely, a conversation." Id. at 83.
53. Winter, supra note 51, at 2233-34.
54. Id. at 2234.
55. Id. (citing GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT
CATEGORIES REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND 84-88 (1987) (describing stereotypes as metonymies
"because the experientially groundedpart (the attributes of some) comes to stand for the whole (the
entire social group.)").
56. Simon, supra note 50, at 1063 (citing MICHEL FOUCAULT, GOVERNMENTALITY 201, in
3 ESSENTIAL WORKS OF FOUCAULT (James D. Faubion ed., 2000) (1965-1984)).

57. Id.
at 1052. With governmental metaphors, Simon notes "[w]hat is being transferred from
one domain (war) to another (law enforcement) is specifically a vision of the role of government
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World War II, quickly spreading to many domains of government, and, as
Simon suggests, supplying a new rationale for governing that entails a
specific set of apparatus and approaches.58 This occurs through the process
of "'radial categories,"' which as Winter shows, is the way meaning can
expand from a primary example of a particular type of thing (Ford for car)
to apply to a larger range of very different examples grouped within a
general category (i.e., Ford would come to stand in for Buicks).5 9
Conceptual metaphors are significant not only for the initial imposition
of a concept from one sphere to another, but also for the entailments
produced by that transfer.60 As Jonathan Simon notes, "[g]overning
through crime metaphors may likewise have had largely political
objectives, but its entailments alter the way we know and act on the nation
as a body politic. ' 61 In the following discussion, I trace the metaphor of the
conniving claimant as it travels through various legal contexts, eventually
arriving at the "War on Terrorism" in the body of the enemy combatant.
III. AN ICONOGRAPHY OF THE "JAUNDICED VIEW" OF THE LAW
A. From Jokes and Legends to Pervasive Cultural Understandings
This Part traces the development of an iconography of a particular set
of images and metaphors excavated from the last several decades of
American political life. Once collected and analyzed, these images and
metaphors present a troubling and persistent picture, which Marc Galanter
has termed the "jaundiced view" of the American civil justice system.62 As
Galanter's scholarship over the last twenty years has shown, there are
grave mischaracterizations about our legal system that proliferate through
a series of jokes, 63 "legal legends," and "elite folklore," which are often

.... It seems justifiable, at any rate, to view metaphors like these as operating in the realm of
political reason." Id. at 1053; see also JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: How THE
WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR (2007).
58. Id. "Nonetheless, the images of a war on poverty, war on crime, war on cancer, war on
drugs, and War on Terrorism continue to invoke the image of an empowered central government
mobilizing the nation and its resources to undertake systematic measures against an enemy that
poses a moral threat." Id.
59. Id. at 1037, 1037 n.12.
60. Id. at 1041.
61. Simon, supra note 50, at 1041.
62. See Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell, supra note 27 and accompanying text.
63. See Marc Galanter, The Conniving Claimant: Changing Images of Misuse of Legal
Remedies, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 647, 653-54 (2000) [hereinafter Galanter, Conniving Claimant]
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stockpiled and then released strategically by a wide range of political
actors within our legal culture, including judges, lawyers, academics,
pundits in think tanks and the media, and of course, politicians. 6'
Journalists and scholars have examined these claims, proving them total
fabrications or severe embellishments. And yet, in most instances, this
limited discovery of these stories' fallaciousness within academic circles
does not reach nearly as wide an audience as do the stories themselves. So,
these stories have become legends, outliving their debunking by
scrupulous researchers, leaving our society at large enraptured by these
"horror stories" of a legal system run amok.65
Galanter attributes this resilience at least in part to the fact that the legal
legends "resonate with many of the basic themes of our legal culture, such
as individual responsibility and self-reliance., 66 These particular themes
have been emphasized as the cause of the "turn to litigiousness" by
conservative critics who blend secular and religious language into a
"powerful and coherent moral vocabulary," that sermonizes against the
tendencies of rights claiming, blaming, and litigating as if they were
infectious diseases. These moralizing calls for "personal responsibility"
view individuals who "control their bodily passions, care for their physical
beings, avoid material harm to themselves, rely on their own resolve, and
insure themselves against accidents and unexpected maladies [as] both
constitut[ing] the moral community and sustain[ing] the health of the
larger 'body politic."' 67 In these accounts, to abstain from engaging the
law and assume personal responsibility for oneself is to emulate the divine,
while to sue is to sin.68
The following discussion catalogues some of the most pernicious
elements of the iconography, laying the groundwork for viewing Senator
(tracing the history of conniving claimant jokes throughout the twentieth century, which initially
highlighted Jews, among other ethnic groups as faking injuries or being overly-zealous in their
readiness to bring a lawsuit, and eventually becoming "de-ethnicized and generalized into worry
about frivolous cases and the litigation explosion.").
64. Id. at 658-63; see also Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell, supra note 27; Marc Galanter,
ChangingLegal Consciousnessin America: The Viewfrom the Joke Corpus, 23 CARDOZO L. REV.

2223 (2002) [hereinafter Galanter, Joke Corpus]; Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation
Explosion, 46 MD. L. REv. 3 (1986) [hereinafter Galanter, The Day After].
65. Galanter, An OilStrike in Hell,supranote 27, at 731, 739-40 (explaining "[a]lthough the
cascade of scholarly criticism has diminished acceptance of the jaundiced view among academic
and practicing lawyers, and among some judges and legislators, the major bastions of the jaundiced
view remain intact .
.
66. Id. at 722.
67. WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW: POLITICS, MEDIA, AND
THE LITIGATION CRISIS 59 (2004).

68. Id. at 56-68.
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Graham's Senate floor theatrics as participating in an established
American cultural discourse. In the language of cognitive science, these
images, metaphors, or stories have over time achieved universal cultural
purchase-when encountered, people immediately recognize their validity
and normalcy as they form part of a shared cultural understanding. As
such, their nefarious origins are taken wholly for granted and forgotten.
B. Conniving Claimants and PredatorLawyers
As Galanter notes, jokes used to circulate depicting conniving
claimants who either fabricated injuries or attested to them malingering
longer than reasonably expected so that those allegedly suffering harm
could get a remedy in court. These conniving claimants were often figured
as foreigners, specifically Jews. According to Galanter, these stories long
ago moved from being a depiction of "bizarre deviations from the normal"
to a "new and alarming normality."69 Galanter continues, "[t]he notion that
deviants or outsiders are misusing the legal system [was] generalized into
the notion that frivolous cases are normal and typical within the legal
° This now pervasive view sees too much law as a debilitative
system."'7
force within society, undermining our most important social institutions
and relations:
Americans in all walks of life are being buried under an avalanche
of lawsuits. Doctors are being sued by patients, [1]awyers are being
sued by clients. Teachers are being sued by students. Merchants,
manufacturers and all levels of government-from Washington,
D.C. to local sewer boards-are being sued by people of all sorts.
This epidemic of hair-trigger suing, as one jurist calls it, even has
infected the family. Children haul their parents into court, while
husbands and wives sue each other, brothers sue brothers, and
friends sue friends. 7
It soon became accepted as social fact that the courts were being "clogged
with litigation."72 As a result, the public came to view lawyers as agents

69. See Galanter, Conniving Claimant, supranote 63, at 660.
70. See id.
71. Id. at 659-60 (citing Why Everybody is SuingEverybody,U.S. NEWS& WORLD REP., Dec.
4, 1978, at 50).
72. Id.at 660; see also Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell, supra note 27, at 731-32 (citing an
Oakland Tribune editorial diatribe about the McDonald's coffee case-perhaps the paradigmatic
horror story of litigation circulating in America-that queries the readers: "[i]s there any doubt in
anyone's mind that our legal system is being badly abused? Greedy lawyers, victims out to make
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catalyzing undesirable changes in American society.7 3 One survey found
that "over half the public thought it a fair criticism of most lawyers that
[t]hey file too many lawsuits and tie up the court system[,]" while another
survey found that 74% of those queried agreed that "the amount of
litigation in America today is hampering this country's economic
recovery."74
One of the primary mediums for transmitting this set of beliefs about
the law has come through paradigmatic stories about excessive litigation
and excessive damages. These horror stories, such as the McDonald's
coffee case, 75 or the case of the psychic who brought suit for loss of her
business as a spiritual advisor due to complications from a CAT
scan Y--came to plague American society, convincing us of the "litigation
explosion" 77 and its rising monetary and social costs. They have come to
comprise a modem folklore expressing conventional wisdom that everyone
accepts as true.
As Galanter shows, these stories were worked up into legends by
sectors in corporate America, lobbyists, pundits, and writers in corporatesponsored think tanks, who distorted the numbers and gave partial,
decontextualized accounts of the claims and subsequent litigation (if they
were even pursued). They bombarded the public with images of "irksome
78
and destructive liability and frequent and excessive punitive awards.
The McDonald's coffee case, as Galanter notes, is the most famous

a buck, and a culture that encourages people to sue instead of accepting their own responsibility or
working things out, have clogged courts with cases that don't belong there.").
73. Marc Galanter, PredatorsandParasites:Lawyer-Bashing and Civil Justice, 28 GA. L.
REv. 633, 634 (1994) (providing a "taxonomy of anti-lawyer themes" describing lawyers as: "(1)
corrupters of discourse; (2) fomenters of strife; (3) betrayers of trust; (4) economic predators.").
74. Galanter, Conniving Claimant,supra note 63, at 664. Elsewhere Galanter adds that this
"hypertrophy" of our legal institutions is thought to come with a
[C]oncomitant erosion of community, decline of self-reliance, and atrophy of
informal self-regulatory mechanisms. It has become a commonplace that the
United States is the most litigious nation on earth, indeed in human history, and
that excessive resort to law marks America's moral decline and portends painful
political and economic consequences.
Galanter, The Day After, supra note 64, at 4.
75. Liebeck v. McDonald's Restaurants, No. CV-93-02419, 1995 WL 360309 (N.M. Dist.
Aug. 18, 1994).
76. Haimes v. Temple Univ. Hosp., 39 Pa. D. & C.3d 381, 1986 WL 2187 (Pa. C.P. 1986).
77. See Galanter, The Day After, supra note 64, at 5-7 (discussing and providing examples
of the "litigation explosion").
78. Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell, supra note 27, at 740.
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contemporary example of such horror stories; and who, upon hearing it,
does not immediately think of its associated imagery of frivolous lawsuits
resulting in excessive rewards?7 9 In a brief review of some then current
legends, Galanter describes an ideal type of such stories: they focus on
"nutty claims" that are often dismissed by courts (if they are even
litigated). They "invariably tell of a claim by an individual against an
institution, governmental body, or corporation," but never deal with claims
brought between individuals or by corporate entities against one another
nor with "grotesque or frivolous defenses.""0 "It is a universe in which
corporations and governments are victims, and individuals (and their
lawyers) are the aggressors."'" Furthermore,
these stories are neither experiential nor analytic accounts, but
disembodied cartoon-like tales that pivot on a single bizarre feature
....They are abstracted from media accounts and re-circulated by
entrepreneurial publicists through a succession of other media. In
the course of this recirculation, they are further simplified and
decontextualized. They are placed in a timeless narrative present.
The focus is on the claimant and the triviality of the claim. Thus,
the West Virginia horror story emphasizes the pickle jar but omits
the violation of state policy concerning reemployment .... 8 2

79. See id. at 731-32 (describing the "pattern of decontextualization" these horror stories
present through the illustration of the McDonald's case). In addition, Galanter notes that the
story of the spill, the suit and the $2.9 million award is abstracted from the facts
about the extent of plaintiff's injury (third degree bums on legs and groin
necessitating skin grafts); the defendant's practice of serving coffee twenty or so
degrees hotter that [sic] the standard in the trade; its earlier encounter with some
seven hundred claims of this type, some of which it settled (for a total outlay of
more than $500,000); the defendant's refusal of plaintiff's initial request for
payment of her medical (and attendant) expenses (about $11,000), which it
countered with an offer of $800; its rejection of settlement proposals by her lawyer
and of a court-appointed mediator's recommendation that the parties settle for
$225,000; and the subsequent judicial reduction of the punitive award (from the
jury's $2.7 million, supposedly an estimation of two days of McDonald's coffee
sales, to $480,000, three times the amount of the compensatory damages); or the
subsequent settlement between the parties ....
"
Id. at 732. Glanter also noted that the undisclosed settlement did not exceed $600,000. Id. at 732
n.72.
80. Id.
81. Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell, supra note 27, at 731.
82. Id. (footnote omitted).
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The psychic and the CAT scan story, which through its extensive
recirculation became, in Galanter's words, "a poster child for tort
reform" 83 through its extensive recirculation, offers a helpful illustration
of how these legends are born. A woman claimed she had experienced an
allergic reaction and other complications resulting from the injection of
dye during a CAT scan. The complications included headaches, which she
claimed impaired her clairvoyant abilities, resulting in her being forced to
go out of business as a spiritual advisor.84 The jury failed to follow the trial
court judge's instructions to not consider the claims for losses related to
her psychic business, and awarded her $988,000 in damages.8 ' Four
months later, the judge ruled that the jury had either disregarded his
instructions or made an award that was "grossly excessive" and set aside
the initial award as well as granted the defendant's request for a new
trial.86 After transfer to a different judge who disqualified the originally
proffered expert, the psychic was non-suited and the Pennsylvania
Superior Court upheld the ruling. 7
What could have become a narrative of the law working, of an
appropriate correction for a distortion in the system, was not seen as such,
but rather, was seized upon and distorted as evidence of the civil justice
system run amok. A year after the suit, President Reagan, during a speech
to the College of Physicians in Philadelphia, cited the case stating, "well,
a new trial was ordered in that case, but the excesses of the courts have
taken their toll. As a result, in some parts of the country, women haven't
been able to find doctors to deliver their babies, and other medical services
have become scarce and more expensive."88 According to Reagan's
version and later adaptations of it, an outrageous claim led to the use of
underhanded tactics like the use of so-called "experts," which led to an
outrageous award for damages. 89 As Reagan summed up the moral of the

83. Id.at 727; see supra note 76.
84. Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell, supra note 27, at 726-27.
85. Id.at 727.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 728.
89. See Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell, supra note 27, at 728. Galanter notes that the story
lived on: five years later, Peter Huber used it in a campaign against "junk science" in the
courtroom, turning a story "about an outrageous claim and outrageous award..." into one about
"outrageous expert testimony." Id.at 728. This was then picked up by the President's Council on
Competitiveness, which in an edited version of the story, failed to mention the reversal of the case,
concluding, "[s]tories such as this are becoming almost commonplace ....Id.Galanter observes
that the Council "transforms a cautionary tale of something bizarre that almost happened into a
report of something typical and prevalent. Liberated from its anti-climactic ending, the tale of the
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story, such litigation disables the productive parts of American society
because of the associated costs driven up by the threat of litigation.
The reality is that the tort system suffers from what law professor
Richard Abel characterized as a chronic "crisis of underclaiming." 90
Indeed, as Galanter's research shows, the rates of claiming, with the
exception of car-related injuries, are low, and potential claims frequently
are not pursued. Pertinent to this particular exaggeration by Reagan, a
Harvard study of medical malpractice in New York estimated that "eight
times as many patients suffered an injury from negligence as filed a
malpractice claim in New York State."'"
Reagan's psychic and the CAT scan legend about rampant medical
malpractice was but one in a long line of inaccurate depictions of the civil
justice system, including other areas of law, such as employment
discrimination claiming. 92 As early as the infamous 1976 Roscoe Pound

psychic and the CAT scan is free to occupy its rightful place in the canon of tort horror stories."
Id. at 728-29 (footnote omitted).
90. See Richard L. Abel, The Real Tort Crisis-TooFew Claims, 48 OF-o ST. L.J. 443,447
(1987). Abel's observations remain valid. In 1996, the American Medical Association at last
conceded that medical mistakes are "common," but this was only a superficial "concession,"
because it arrived with a new "anti-litigation" argument that "lawsuits harm patients by driving
error reports underground[,]" which quickly became conventional wisdom. See David A. Hyman
& Charles Silver, The PoorState of Health CareQuality in the U.S.: Is MalpracticeLiabilityPart
of the Problemor Partof the Solution?, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 893, 896 (2005). There, Hyman and
Silver review the evidence on the connections between malpractice exposure, error reporting, and
health care quality, and refute the "conventional wisdom among patient safety advocates and legal
scholars . . . that medical malpractice lawsuits impede efforts to improve health care quality by
encouraging providers to hide mistakes[,]" which serves as a "normative basis for ongoing federal
and state efforts to curtail medical malpractice exposure." Id.at 893. Hyman and Silver conclude
that "[t]here is no foundation for the widely held belief that fear of malpractice liability impedes
efforts to improve the reliability of health care delivery systems." Id. As they observe sardonically,
"[t]he tort system is always part of the problem, never part of the solution." Id. at 896.
91. Galanter, Conniving Claimant,supra note 63, at 663 (footnote omitted).
92. As in most instances, the debates about the relative overextension or underextension of
our legal system or particular areas within it need unpacking and contextualization. See, e.g., Laura
Beth Nielsen & Robert L. Nelson, Rights Realized? An Empirical Analysis of Employment
DiscriminationLitigation as a ClaimingSystem, 2005 Wis. L. REV. 663 (reviewing doctrinal and
statutory developments in employment discrimination law, social scientific literature on
discrimination in the workplace, and analyzing data available about employment discrimination
litigation in the federal courts from 1990 to 2001). Nielsen and Nelson found that the claim of
"overexpansiveness" of the employment discrimination claiming system "is premised on some
uncontested observations and some problematic assertions." Id. at 666. Nielsen and Nelson wrote:
It is clear that federal, state, and municipal laws now formally offer broad legal
protections from workplace discrimination for minorities, women, the disabled,
working parents, and the aged, among others. It is also clear that the number of
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Conference, Supreme Court Chief Justice Warren Berger popularized this
jaundiced view, which helped give rise to the alternative dispute resolution
(ADR) movement that swept thousands of cases from various sectors out
of the courts. 93 Berger's efforts came as part of a much larger backlash to
restrict access to justice that was fueled by an anxiety among elites in the
1970s that the expansion of judicial remedies and its extension to
previously marginalized groups had radically raised the citizenry's
expectations about the law's ability to vindicate rights. 94
Lawyers were first characterized as predators in the 1970s, a theme that
has continued since then. 95 Intense feelings of resentment grew among
America's professionals and business community for what was perceived
' 96
as efforts to expose them to "unwanted and unwarranted accountability
(through the emergence of medical malpractice, product liability, civil
rights, wrongful discharge, stockholder class actions, and other sorts of

charges of discrimination made to the EEOC increased over 16% between 1992
and 2002, and that the number of federal employment discrimination lawsuits rose
161% between 1990 and 2001. As the number of claims has grown, the variety of
types of discrimination alleged also has increased. Whereas charges of racial and
gender discrimination in hiring and promotion predominated in the early years of
the Civil Rights Act, the current set of claims include large numbers of allegations
of discriminatory firing, sexual harassment, age discrimination, and disability
discrimination.
Nielsen & Nelson, supra (footnotes omitted). The authors also observe, consistent with Galanter's
and Haltom and McCann's research, that the growth in scale and diversity of employment
discrimination claims "has produced a backlash of criticism against employment discrimination
laws by some members of the employment defense bar and conservative commentators that
contains more debatable assertions" than the federal statistics presented above. Id.(footnotes
omitted). Echoing Galanter, Nielsen and Nelson point out that these critics, "[o]ften focusing on
media reports of major awards, ... "insist that "antidiscrimination law has become a windfall for
plaintiffs." Id.at 667 (footnote omitted). Insurance companies, the authors note, have tried to
capitalize on these perceptions in their marketing of new products by "repeat[ing] the most
dramatic stories of employer liability in discrimination suits." Id.(footnote omitted). Nielsen and
Nelson also point out the complicity of academics in generating this folklore, pointing to the work
of John Donohue and Peter Siegelman, who claim that the Civil Rights Act of 1991, along with an
increasingly entrepreneurial plaintiffs' bar, generate "more lawsuits and larger awards, even though
the underlying phenomena of workplace discrimination may actually be declining." Id.(footnote
omitted).
93. See LAURA NADER, THE LIFE OF THE LAW: ANTHROPOLOGICAL PROJECTS 48-49 (2002).
94. Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell, supra note 27, at 718.
95. Galanter, Joke Corpus,supranote 64, at 2230. Galanter further noted the observation of
Wall Street Journalcolumnist Paul Gigot that "lawyers have replaced trade unionists as the chief
scourge of American business." Id.at 2231.
96. Id.
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litigation.97 ). This resentment is not limited, according to Galanter, to angst
over individual victimization at the hands of lawyers; rather, lawyers are
also seen as "destroying social assets and unraveling the social fabric."98
Indeed, lawyers came to be viewed as agents of "chaos" and "disorder"
in society, and even as a threat to the very foundations of the American
way of life, namely, democracy and capitalism.99 In the late 1970s,
Laurence H. Silberman, who later became a federal judge, asked in a trade
00
journal, Regulation,"Will Lawyering Strangle Democratic Capitalism?"'
In the article he explained how "the legal process, because of its unbridled
growth, has become a cancer which threatens the vitality of our forms of
capitalism and democracy[,]" and further denounced "the harmful impact
of an ever expanding legal process on our society." '' Silberman traced the
expansion of rights discourse to new spheres of the previously
disenfranchised to a weakening in the "intermediate institutions [families,
churches, schools, corporations, labor unions, and political parties] ... that
are indispensable pillars of a pluralistic democracy."'0 2 The proliferation
of law to the hitherto unregulated parts of our society and economy, and
subsequent purported "litigation explosion" was becoming "a major
structural impediment to our economy," potentially offering a competitive
advantage to Japan and Europe."0 3 As Galanter sums it up, the expansion
of litigation was no longer a narrow concern affecting discrete spheres of
life, institutions, or industries, but had now grown so pernicious that it
threatened our collective survival, with lawyers becoming "dangerous
parasites in the national bloodstream ... an entropic drag against the
constructive forces of society.""
C. Beyond Tort Deform
The attack on conniving claimants and the predator lawyers who aid
and abet them could not help but eventually spread to judges as well, as
the conservative right began its campaign against liberal activist judges

97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.at 2232-33.
100. Galanter, Joke Corpus, supra note 64, at 2233 (quoting Laurence H. Silberman, Will
Lawyering Strangle Democratic Capitalism?, 2 REGULATION 15 (1978) [hereinafter Silberman,
Democratic Capitalism]).
101. Id.(quoting Silberman, Democratic Capitalism,supranote 100, at 15, 44).
102. Id.(quoting Silberman, Democratic Capitalism,supranote 100, at 18).
103. Id.(quoting Silberman, Democratic Capitalism,supranote 100, at 21).
104. Id.at 2233-34.
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who "make up the law"' 5 rather than interpret it, aided by legal doctrines
such as due process and habeas corpus. Judges themselves were not the
immediate threat to society; just as predator lawyers supposedly facilitated
and legitimized conniving claimants' frivolous complaints against honest
businesses, so too the conservatives construed judges as giving aid to the
enemy, i.e., the criminals who "terrorize the streets in too many of
America's cities."" President Reagan, in defense of his nomination of
ultra-conservative Robert Bork, lauded Bork's tough but fair stance on
crime, and stated very clearly the decision Americans had to make:
Three choices are what this battle is all about: the choice between
liberal judges who make up the law or sound judges who interpret
the law; the choice between liberal judges whose decisions protect
criminals or firm judges whose decisions protect the victims; the
choice between liberal judges selected by the liberal special
interests or distinguished judges selected to serve the people. °7
Of course, the Reagan Revolution and all that it entailed goes far beyond
this attack on liberal activist judges; but this; conception of the role of
judges within society came to play and continue to play a powerful role in
American political discussions, as will be seen in the context of the DTA
debates, discussed below. This paradigm portrays liberal judges as
inverting the rule of settled legal tradition, while "distinguished"
conservative judges protect our traditions on behalf of "the people."'0° One
need look no further than current headlines to see the ever-present
reverberations of this mythology. Shortly after a federal judge's mother
and husband were killed and a state court judge was shot to death on the
bench in Atlanta, Senator John Cornyn, a Texas Republican, reflected:
I wonder whether there may be some connection between the
perception in some quarters, on some occasions, where judges are
making political decisions yet are unaccountable to the public, that
it builds up and builds up and builds up to the point where some

105. See Ronald Reagan, Remarks at a White House Briefing on the Nomination of Robert
H. Bork to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States (Sept. 30, 1987),
[hereinafter Reagan Remarks], http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1987/093087b.
htm; see also Jacob V. Lamar, Jr., Gone with the Wind, TIME, Oct. 12, 1987, available at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,965715,00.html.
106. Reagan Remarks, supra note 105.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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engage in, engage in violence. Certainly without any justification,
but a concern I have. 10 9
The attack on the judiciary and the courts has spread to many other
policy areas, including criminal justice, immigration, terrorism, and the
Alien Tort Statute," 0 which provides civil remedies to noncitizens for
human rights abuse suffered abroad. Particularly with crime and
immigration, the Republican-dominated 104th Congress attempted a
radical redefinition of the rule of law as it pertained to perceived
"undesirables" whose very presence in our society supposedly undermines
its core values and makes Americans less safe. 1 ' The Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)," 2 passed in the wake of the
Oklahoma City bombing carried out by American terrorist Timothy
McVeigh, semantically linked these groups of "undesirables," instituting
a new paradigm that privileged security over immigrants' rights.'13 As
Senator Kennedy noted during debates over AEDPA, "[u]sing the phony
label of antiterrorism, the bill achieves two reprehensible goals: it denies
meaningful habeas corpus review to State death row inmates, and it makes
it easier to turn away refugees and victims of political persecution .... ,"
In this way, AEDPA linked criminals and immigrants with terrorists.
All were collectively labeled as forces within our society-like conniving
claimants before them-whose enjoyment of robust political rights and
access to court would come at a detriment to normal, innocent peoples'
lives and the smooth functioning of the economy and society. The

109. See Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg Happy with Democratic Congress,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 11, 2007.

110. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991,28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2002) [hereinafter Alien Tort
Statute (ATS) or Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA)].
111. See Daniel Kanstroom, The Better Partof Valor: The REAL ID Act, Discretion,andthe
"Rule" oflmmigration Law, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 161 (2006) [hereinafter Kanstroom, The Better
Partof Valor]. Kanstroom described 1996 as a year that "saw radical attacks on judicial review of
immigration cases," as the Republican Congress and Clinton Administration "fundamentally
restructured immigration law." Id.at 162. Kanstroom pointed out that the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 was "extraordinarily far-ranging and implicat[ed]
constitutional provisions from Article III to the Suspension Clause and the First and Fifth
Amendments." Id.at 162 n.6. See also Daniel Kanstroom, Surroundingthe Hole in the Doughnut:
Discretionand Deference in U.S. ImmigrationLaw, 71 TUL. L. REv. 703 (1997).
112. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104132, 110 Stat. 1214 [hereinafter AEDPA] (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22,
28, 40, 42 U.S.C.).
113. See generally Jonathan L. Hafetz, The Untold Story ofNoncriminalHabeasCorpus and
the 1996 ImmigrationActs, 107 YALE L.J. 2509 (1998).
114. 142 CONG. REc. S3458 (daily ed. Apr. 17, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
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jaundiced view of the law viewed criminals and immigrants as opposing
both direct and indirect threats to society. The direct threat consisted of
their values and lifestyles, which were seen as inherently destructive of
mainstream culture, but the indirect threat they posed was more subtle;
according to the jaundiced view of the law, subversion by these groups
would also happen through the legal efforts expended by their lawyers and
the "liberal activist judges" who sought to protect their already emaciated
rights. Similar to the conniving claimants' frivolous claims, the extension
of legal protections to these unwanted groups allegedly slowed the works
of our justice system. Furthermore, because they were innately
undeserving of such protections, such claiming and due process could only
be seen as an unnecessary expenditure of precious national energies. The
overhaul of these regulatory areas is too vast a topic to cover adequately
here, but a brief synopsis will be presented below.
1. AEDPA and IIRIRA
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of
1996115 was Congress's attempt to deal with what was perceived as the
problematic use of federal habeas corpus for state prisoners. In defending
the new habeas bill, Senator Orin Hatch argued that reform was needed to
eliminate "frivolous appeal after frivolous appeal ... [,]" particularly in
the death penalty context." 6 The facts, of course, are more complicated
than this blithe statement; warnings, such as Hatch's, need to be
contextualized with the extreme rise in prison population over the last
three decades." 7
AEDPA was a comprehensive overhaul of habeas law and practice, and
now occupies the field, precluding previous arrangements be they

115.

See AEDPA, supranote 112.
116. 141 CONG. REc. S7596 (daily ed. May 26, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
117. Galanter synthesizes statistics from several sources to show that in a nine-year period,
from 1975 to 1984, prisoner petitions (not necessarily exclusively federal death penalty habeas
petitions) increased by 61%, but this must be put into the context that the prison population (state
and federal) of the United States grew by 74% during the same time period. The federal prison
population grew from 24,131 in 1975 to 34,263 in 1984, and then 40,223 in 1985, but "the rate of
petitions dropped sharply from 209.2 per 1,000 in 1975 to 132.1 per 1,000 in 1984, and then
jumped back to 155.7 in 1985." Galanter, The DayAfter, supranote 64, at 18 nn.53-54. As of 2005,
there are 2.2 million inmates in U.S. prisons and jails, capping off a 33-year continuous rise,

placing the U.S. incarceration rate as the highest in the world. In the last decade alone, the federal
prison population has doubled despite a return to crime rates unseen since the 1960s. See The
Sentencing Project, New Incarceration Figures: Thirty-Three Consecutive Yeas of Growth,
http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/1044.pdf (last visited July 12, 2007).
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statutorily conceived or contrived through decisional law. 118 The most
controversial provision of the new habeas law is 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d),
which governs the deference a federal court reviewing a habeas petition
must accord to a state court's decision.1 19 Past statements about a federal
court's duty to review a state prisoners' federal claim de novo suggested
that a federal judge reviews the case without necessarily referring to the
prior state court judgment. However, the new formulation of § 2254(d)
refocuses the reviewing court's attention, requiring it foremost to focus on
the state court's adjudication of the claim, answering
the question as to
1 20
whether or not it reached the proper conclusion.
Though the Senate version of what would become AEDPA did not try
to address immigration issues, the House version made several drastic
changes to asylum law. First, in contravention of Article 31 of the Refugee
Convention, it gave prescreening officers the authority to deport, without
a full hearing before an immigration judge, an asylum seeker who enters
the country with false or no documents. At no point in this accelerated
process is the asylum-seeker accorded counsel or an interpreter. 12 1 In the
words of Senator Kennedy, AEDPA also "return[ed] to the discredited
cold war guilt-by-association policy of the McCarran-Walter law,
excluding individual[s] from our shores based on mere membership in an
organization," and did so unnecessarily, because existing law already
122
afforded authority to exclude members of known terrorist organizations.
As in the criminal context, judicial review has always played a special
role as guarantor of individual rights in the realm of immigration law.
Over the last decade, however, the government has repeatedly attempted
to restrict the access of immigrants to the courts through various
jurisdiction-stripping clauses, to streamline the process of review, and to
enact provisions that constrain the discretion of judges.
In 1996, Congress passed, and the President signed, both the AEDPA
and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act

118. See generally Larry W. Yackle, A Primeron the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 BuFF.
L. REV. 381 (1996).
119. Id. at 382 (describing § 2254(d) as the provision that "has drawn the lion's share of
attention, both in Congress and in professional and academic circles.").
120. Id. at 383.
121. See generally AEDPA, supra note 112. Specifically, the amendments were in Subtitle
C-Modification to Asylum Procedures, § 421-Denial of Asylum to Alien Terrorists; §
422-Inspection and Exclusion of Immigration Officers; § 423-Judicial Review. Id.
122. 142 CONG. REc. S3458 (daily ed. Apr. 17, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
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(IIRIRA). 123 The anti-immigration clauses of the AEDPA and the IIRIRA
were aimed at restricting judicial review of final orders of deportation for
permanent legal residents convicted of certain enumerated criminal
offenses, including minor crimes. 124 Similar to the efforts discussed below
with regard to the enemy combatants, AEDPA and IIRIRA collectively
place the entire deportation process under the control of the executive
branch. The Acts effectively exclude all opportunities for judicial
125
participation in some cases and limit the scope of review in others.
These changes are profound 26given the judiciary's historically important
role in immigration matters. 1
It is significant to note that the IIRIRA's name harkens back to the
moralizing arguments by social conservatives from the litigation and tort
reform debates. Social conservatives blamed conniving claimants and the
litigation explosion for eviscerating both the moral fabric of the nation and
the longstanding commitment of Americans to individual responsibility.
Their argument was that people had stopped taking responsibility for their
own actions and instead preferred to "pass the buck" by suing someone
else rather than face their guilt.127 Here too, harsh deportation procedures
against an unwanted population are presented as necessary. The IIRJRA
puts forth the moral argument that if a legal, permanent resident has
committed a crime, then the resident has abused his or her privileges and
the kind hospitality of the United States. Therefore, a legal, permanent
resident must assume individual responsibility for illegal actions. As will
be seen with the DTA, the scope of the IIRIRA taps into a persistent trope
that warns against both overextending the resources of the U.S. legal
system and, more importantly, not being taken advantage of by forces that
seek to undermine our society. The argument behind the latter warning is

123. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub.
L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 [hereinafter IIRIRAI (codified in scattered sections of 8, 18,
& 42 U.S.C.A.).
124. IIRIRA § 306(a), 110 Stat. at 3009-607 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) (2002))
("Notwithstanding any other provision of law.., no court shall have jurisdiction to review any
final order of removal against an alien who is removable by reason of having committed [certain]
criminal offense[s] .... "); 110 Stat. at 3009-612 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (2002))
("[N]otwithstanding any other provision of law ... no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any
cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney
General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien
under this chapter."); see also IIRIRA § 306(b), 110 Stat. at 3009-611 (repealing 8 U.S.C. § 1105a).
125. See Hafetz, supra note 113, at 2509.
126. Id.
127. See supra Part II.A.
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that providing undeserved support makes us vulnerable. In truth, however,
providing such support is merely providing equal protection under the law.
As Hafetz notes, the joint operation of AEDPA and IRIRA forecloses
courts from reviewing a variety of legal questions.'28 Prior to IIRIRA,
judges could weigh a range of considerations in determining whether
29
aliens who were found deportable could be granted relief under §212(c).1
Additionally, before AEDPA and IIRRA, a judge could look at a variety
of favorable elements under § 212(c), including family ties and duration
of residence within the United States, evidence of hardship in the event of
deportation, employment history, armed forces service record, community
service, and other evidence of good character and potential to contribute
to American society. 3 ° Barring this discretionary review thus reduces a
convicted legal resident to nothing but an illegal immigrant who has
overstayed his or her welcome and has taken advantage of the good graces
of the United States by violating its laws.
Moreover, as in other areas where the jaundiced view of the law
operates, these restrictive gestures did not confine themselves to the
criminal context, as in AEDPA, but seeped into the targeting of
noncriminal aliens as well.' 3 ' Hafetz gathers several cases where district
courts "have already found that the IIRIRA narrows judicial review of the
INS's denial of a noncriminal alien's attempt to stay deportation pending
a motion to reconsider his deportation order."' 3 2 In addition, he observes,
the IIRIRA eliminates judicial review over "all denials of discretionary
relief except asylum,"' 33 including denials of suspensions of deportation
based on continuous presence, good moral character, or hardship resulting
from deportation.' 34
A few short years later, the 9/11 attacks created a fresh impetus for new
restrictive measures. The Department of Homeland Security replaced the
Immigration and Naturalization service, and streamlining regulations

128. Hafetz, supra note 113, at 2509-10.
129. See id. at 2510. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 212(c),
66 Stat. 163, 187 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (2002)); see also Francis v. INS, 532
F.2d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that § 212(c) relief is available in deportation as well as
exclusion proceedings). "The IIRIRA eliminated [§] 212(c) relief and replaced it with 'cancellation
ofremoval."' IIRIRA § 304(b), 110 Stat. at 3009-594 to -596 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (2002)).
Hafetz, supra note 113, at 2510 n.7.
130. Hafetz, supra note 113, at 2510 n.10 (citing In re Marin, 161. & N. Dec. 581, 584-85
(B.I.A. 1978)).
131. Id.at2510.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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adopted in August 2002 emaciated the internal review ofjudicial decisions
by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). The BIA was halved in size,
with its three-judge panels reduced to panels of one. This streamlining also
created greater pressure on federal courts, leading to calls for further
restriction of judicial review, despite the recognition by astute observers
such as Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit that federal judicial
review35 was necessary to compensate for the "staggering" error rate of the
1
BIA.

Though the Supreme Court would reaffirm the importance of judicial
review of habeas petitions over deportation orders in INS v. St. Cyr, 1 36 this
precipitated yet another restrictive lashing back in the form of the REAL
ID Act of 2005 (REAL ID).137 notably, REAL ID, came packaged as part
of the much larger (and widely regarded as essential) 138 Emergency
Supplemental Appropriation Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror,
and Tsunami Relief. REAL ID precluded district court jurisdiction over
habeas appeals from not only final removal proceedings (as had been the
case) but in other contexts as well. 139 Significantly, a substantial aspect of
REAL ID was a concerted effort to harmonize state and federal

135. Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 829-30 (7th Cir. 2005).
136. Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
137. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 [hereinafter REAL ID].
138. See 152 CONG. REC. S 11,742, S 11,746 (daily ed. Dec. 8,2006) (statement of Sen. Akaka)
(describing the passage of REAL ID). Senator Akaka claimed that it was
attached to a must-pass piece of legislation . . . in Conference and therefore
received virtually no scrutiny before passage. Every member of Congress who
supported providing much needed funding to our troops and relief to the Indonesia
tsunami victims was forced to vote in favor of the REAL ID Act, an unrelated bill.
Id.
139. See Emergency Supplemental Appropriaton Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror,
and Tsunami Relief, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13,119 Stat. 231; 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(a)(2)(B) (2007);
Kanstroom, The Better Partof Valor, supranote 111, at 164, 164 n. 14 (noting that this change was
an apparent response to cases since 1996 determining that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) applied only
to decisions made in the removal context) (citing cases). See also Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration
Law andFederalCourtJurisdictionThrough the Lens ofHabeas Corpus,91 CORNELLL. REV. 459
(2006). According to Motomura, St. Cyr
confirmed that although many noncitizens subject to final removal orders could
not obtain review of pivotal issues in their cases by means of a petition for review
in the courts of appeals, they nevertheless could challenge final removal orders by
raising questions of law in habeas petitions filed in the federal district courts.
Id. at 469.
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identification documentation with the databases linked to motor vehicle
records, which would enhance the ability of law enforcement authorities
to gather and share information on state driver's license holders."'4 These
changes, like many other processes introduced in the post-9/11
administrative state, raised significant worries among those concerned
about privacy rights and civil liberties.' 4 '
2. Attacking the Alien Tort Statute (ATS)
The ATS was introduced in the 1789 Judiciary Act, and provides for
jurisdiction in the lower courts for "any civil action by an alien for a tort
only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States.', 14 2 On October 17, 2005, Senator Diane Feinstein (D-CA)
introduced S. 1874, "The Alien Tort Statute Reform Act," which she said
was aimed at "clarif[ying] the meaning and scope of the Alien Tort Statute
[ATS] ., , 4 Feinstein claims to have introduced the legislation to clarify
ambiguities left by the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Sosa v. AlvarezMachain. " By "clarifying" Feinstein really meant "stripping" because her
legislation would have eviscerated the ATS, one of the only substantial
legal remedies for victims of human rights abuse.

140. See REAL ID, supranote 137, §§ 201-208.
141. See 152 CONG. REc. S 11,742, S 11,746 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 2006) (statement of Sen.
Akaka). Senator Akaka commented regarding civil liberties concerns:
The REAL ID Act will require each state's driver's licensing agency to collect and
store substantial numbers of records containing licensees' most sensitive
personally identifiable information, including one's social security number, proof
of residence, and biometric identifiers such as a digital photograph and signature.
If the new state databases are compromised, they will provide one-stop access to
virtually all information necessary to commit identity theft.
Id. For more, see ACLU, Real Nightmare, at http://www. realnightmare.org/. As of this writing,
the states are in various stages of implementation or outright protest of the REAL ID Act. See
Thomas Frank, 6 States Defy Law Requiring ID Cards, USA TODAY (June 18, 2007),
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-06-18-id-cardsN.htm?csp=34. Six state legislatures
(Maine, Montana, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Washington) have passed laws
opposing the national legislation. Id. Most states complain that the REAL ID Act's new standards
are too costly to implement (the National Conference of State Legislatures estimates a total of$11
billion), and the new national ID card does not have enough safeguards to prevent identity theft.
Id.
142. Alien Tort Statute (ATS), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2002).
143. 151 CONG. REC. S 11,433 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 2005) (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
144. See id.; Sosa v. Alvarez-Macrain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
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What is fascinating about this instance of the jaundiced view is that the
rhetoric is wielded by a Democratic politician, demonstrating the absolute
prevalence of this discourse in our society. In advocating for her
legislation, Feinstein pointed to a Washington Post editorial on AlvarezMachain,which expressed concerns that deciding the grounds for lawsuits
in the United States for human rights abuses abroad is "surely a legislative
question, not one for the freewheeling discretion of judges.' ' 145 To this
Feinstein added, "[t]he Court's hesitation to legislate from the bench shifts
the responsibility to this body. ."."."14
Feinstein's rhetoric should not be
seen solely in terms of separation of powers; it partakes in, and thereby
reinforces, folklore positioned against "an intrusive147activist judiciary" and
all that has been shown above to go along with it.
Feinstein also borrowed from, and further reinforced, other cultural
tropes concerning the litigation explosion and the rising costs of litigation.
She presented the Senate with "facts" stating that "[t]here are estimates
that dozens of existing alien tort suits claim damages collectively in excess
of $200 billion dollars.' ' 148 Feinstein then editorialized, "[t]hat's an
extraordinary sum that rightly concerns the U.S. business community,
particularly given numerous inconsistent federal courts verdicts handed
down in the past two decades.' 4 9 In other words, this is a substantial
threat, and the law is unruly and prone to excess and irrational behavior.
Therefore, the current law needs to be reigned in and controlled through
reform.
Feinstein reinforces this threat by presenting the ATS in its current
formulation the way Justice Berger and the corporate propaganda machine
portrayed the proliferation of rights and legal remedies a few decades ago.
Her legislation "deters private plaintiffs from filing sweeping and specious
claims simply because a corporation has a U.S. legal nexus and deep
pockets."' 15 In defending the need for a requirement of specific intent,
Feinstein argued that "[iln my view, we need to deter legal fishing
expeditions, whereby plaintiffs come to the bar with flinty facts backing
weak charges."'' Here Feinstein taps into what Galanter, Haltom, and
McCann have shown to be popular cultural beliefs about conniving
claimants and predator lawyers: the zealousness with which American

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

151 CoNG. REc. S 11,433 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 2005) (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
Id.
See generally Galanter, An Oil Strike from Hell, supra note 27.
151 CONG. REc. S11,434 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 2005) (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
Id.
Id.

151.

Id.
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lawyers tempt potential clients into suing for baseless claims is nothing
more than greedy opportunists going after large corporate defendants'
deep pockets.152
Feinstein also reinforces the mythological effects of litigation:
destabilizing and undermining core social institutions, such as economic
activity. Feinstein suggests that the real intent of these actions to hold
corporations accountable for gross violations of human rights "is to rely
on an extensive legal discovery process to uncover matters that embarrass
companies and delay their business plans. 15 3 Even more boldly, Feinstein
asserts that "these particular suits, brought by foreigners for massive
monetary damages, threaten the international economic activities that are
important to sustaining the American economy."' 54 Once again, litigation
to enforce basic rights is seen as a counterproductive force in society-an
"entropic drag," as Galanter phrased it. 55 Furthermore, these
unmeritorious claims clogging our courts and slowing down our economy
are being brought by "foreigners." Though Feinstein does not draw it out
further, the subtle added value of mentioning the identity of the claimants
has a powerful impact, as it draws upon and reinforces earlier images of
foreign conniving claimants fabricating or embellishing injuries for
monetary reward.
Similar to the restrictions on habeas and judges' discretion in
immigration cases, Feinstein's proposals sought procedural modifications
as well, which would have had the effect of restricting the ATS's utility as
a tool for human rights activists seeking justice for victims of the most
heinous crimes known to humanity. The most regressive of Feinstein's
proposals were her attempts to heighten the standard for liability under
' to prohibit lawyers suing under ATS from charging contingency
ATS "56
152. See supra Part II.A.
153. 151 CONG. REC. Si 1,435 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 2005) (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
154. Id. This echoed arguments put forward by a report published in 2003 by a Washington,
D.C. think-tank, the Institute for International Economics (lIE), which "described ATCA [also
called ATS] as 'an awakening monster' that could expose multinational corporations to the
possibility ofbeing sued in U.S. courts for 'abetting China's denial of political rights,' or observing
Chinese bans on unions, or damaging the Chinese environment." See Underthe Shadow ofA TCA,
FDI MAG. (June 5, 2006), http://www.fdimagazine.com/news/fullstory.php/aid/1668Under the
shadow of ATCA.html. The IE argued that the "real victim" of these suits would not be the
corporations paying out upwards of $20 billion in punitive damages, but the global economy. Id.
"It argued that the scope of awards under ATCA would be such that 'investment and trade in
developing countries will be seriously threatened . . . the ultimate losers will be millions of
impoverished people denied an opportunity to participate in global markets."' Id.
155. See Galanter, Joke Corpus, supra note 64 and accompanying text.
156. 151 CONG. REC. S 11,435 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 2005) (statement of Sen. Feinstein). While
the elements for vicarious liability claims under the ATS have been proof of a defendant "aiding
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fees, 5 7 and to impose a statute of limitations on ATS claims.158 These
efforts mirror other attempts at the reform of more conventional torts, such
as medical malpractice. 5 9

and abetting" violations, Feinstein's "reform" act sought to ratchet-up the standard so that to be
held liable, a defendant must be a "direct participant acting with specific intent to commit the
alleged tort." Id. Feinstein's proposed standard is nearly impossible to meet, particularly because
most situations of violations that would be actionable under ATS occur through joint ventures like
the Unocal/Total-Burma pipeline project, in which the actual violations may be perpetrated not by
the U.S incorporated company, but by its partners or subcontractors. See also Center for
Constitutional Rights Docket: Doe v. Unocal, Synopsis [hereinafter Synopsis], http://www.ccrny.org/v2/legal/ corporate_accountability/corporateArticle.asp?Obj ID=lrRSFKnmmm&
Content=45 (last visited Sept. 10, 2007). As human rights lawyers have pointed out, "[c]orporations
are liable because they have the power not to be complicit in human rights violations." Id.
(statement of Judith Chomsky, cooperating attorney on Doe v. Unocal). Furthermore, the standard
of "direct participation" with "specific intent" goes against most contemporary understandings of
liability for gross violations of human rights under international law. In August 2004, the Bush
Administration made similar arguments against a standard of aiding and abetting in an amicus brief
filed in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on behalf of California oil giant Unocal. Id.
The Administration argued that Unocal should not be held liable for aiding and abetting human
rights abuses committed against villagers living near Unocal's Yadana pipeline in southern Burma.
Id. The Burmese military, Unocal's partner on the pipeline project, was accused of subjecting the
villagers to rape, murder, torture, and forced labor. Id."The Administration want[ed] the case
dismissed, arguing that aiding and abetting liability 'could deter' companies from 'economic
engagement' with oppressive regimes." Synopsis, supra. As human rights lawyers commented,
"[t]he Administration has previously argued in court that those who aid and abet terrorists can be
sued. But to protect narrow business interests, they now say those who aid and abet crimes against
humanity should be immune." Id.(statement of Richard Herz of EarthRights International, cocounsel for the plaintiffs).
157. See 151 CONG. REc. S 11,436 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 2005) (statement of Sen. Feinstein)
(referencing Alien Tort Statute Reform Act, § (g) which states "[c]ontingency fee arrangements are
prohibited in any action brought under the jurisdiction provided in this section."). This would
severely limit the capacity of nonprofit organizations like the Center for Constitutional Rights,
which pioneered the use of ATS in Filartiga,from bringing future ATS claims. See Filirtiga v.
Pefla-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
158. See 151 CONG. REc. S11,436 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 2005) (statement of Sen. Feinstein)
(referencing Alien Tort Statute Reform Act § (h) which states "no action shall be maintained under
this section unless it is commenced not later than 10 years from the date the injury occurred."). This
statute of limitations is an excessively restrictive move because many ATS claims arise out of gross
violations of human rights in which victims have a difficult time reaching lawyers and the courts.
Furthermore, victims are not often aware that the ATS statute offers them a legal remedy against
their abusers. There is no statute of limitations in the original statute, though courts have implied
a ten year statute of limitations. See John Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 944 n.13 (9th Cir.
2002) (noting the Ninth Circuit's ten year statute of limitations for ATCA claims), vacatedby, 395
F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc); see also Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005)
(en banc).
159. See supra notes 90 & 91 and accompanying text.
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A tremendous outpouring of criticism from civil and human rights
advocacy groups persuaded Feinstein not to request that Senator Arlen
Specter, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, schedule her
legislation for a hearing. 6 ° Feinstein's proposals, even though she
withdrew them, provided support to similar policy arguments aimed at
limiting access to the courts for the most vulnerable populations is not
what matters. The significance is in the language she deployed, the
rhetoric of "court-clogging, " "free-wheeling" judges who may be tempted
to "legislate from the bench," thereby disincetivizing American companies
from doing business and expanding the American economy. The effect
was clear, and it furthered an argument we have heard before: the
overextension of legal rights and remedies has left the country overexposed, and thus, we need to curtail this law-run-amok before it
undermines our productive efforts as a society.
The colonization by the jaundiced view of the law of these various
legal settings-civil damages for corporate and medical torts, habeas
corpus review for criminals, substantial judicial review in the immigration
system, and the availability of the causes of action for violations of human
rights committed abroad-by the jaundiced view of the law served as mere
precursors to the most radical undermining of traditional American legal
values that have occurred in the "War on Terrorism." The next Part
explores how an instrumental piece of this inversion of the rule of
law-the Detainee Treatment Act--came about.
IV. THE POLITICO-CULTURAL MILIEU OF THE GRAHAM AMENDMENT
A. "Congress has been A WOL "'6 as an Executive Runs Amok
Unlike previous instances when U.S. security and sovereign integrity
have been attacked, Congress had for several years remained "essentially
silent" about the technologies of power deployed by the Bush
Administration to combat al-Qaida in the aftermath of 9/1 1.162 Both during
the Civil War, when President Abraham Lincoln suspended the writ of

160. See Senator Diane Feinstein, Letter to SenatorArlen Specter, Chairman,Senate Comm.
On the Judiciary,Oct. 25, 2005, http://www.earthrights.org/campaignfeature/senator-feinsteinputsbreaks on anti-atca bill s.1 874.html. Feinstein explained that "the legislation in itspresent
form calls for refinement in light of concerns raised by human rights advocates, and thus a hearing
or other action by the Committee on this bill would be premature." Id.
161. 151 CONG. REC. S8811 (daily ed. July 25, 2005) (statement of Sen. Graham).
162. See Michael Greenberger, The Missing Link, LEGAL AFF., Sept./Oct. 2005, at 32-34.
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habeas corpus, and following the attacks on Pearl Harbor during World
War H, when President Franklin D. Roosevelt ordered JapaneseAmericans incarcerated, Congress responded promptly, ratifying the
Executive's wartime unilateral actions taken in defense of the nation. In
stark contrast to these earlier moments of crisis, Congress did not pass a
single piece of legislation granting approval to what many view as the
Bush Administration's most excessive reactions to the 9/11 attacks.' 6 3
Congress did nothing about the detainees and the military commissions,
issues that had festered since 2001, until the Judiciary Committee held a
hearing on June 15, 2005. This sudden congressional action occurred just
over a week before the Supreme Court, according to Senator Arlen
Specter, "took the bull by the horns and came down with three decisions
in June of 2004 [Rasul,Hamdi, and Padilla]because the Congress had not
acted."'" According to Specter, congressional acquiescence may be
165
largely attributed to a lack of ideas and deference for the Executive.
Senator Specter claims that Congress "didn't know what to do. It didn't
know quite how to approach it. And perhaps it was too hot to handle.' 66
Senator Specter attempted to make this deference to the Executive seem
like business as usual "in the face of assertions by the executive of the

163. Id. at 32-33. On September 18, 2001 Congress passed the Authorization of the Use of
Military Force (AUMF), giving the President authority to invade Afghanistan in 2001 with
Operation Enduring Freedom. Id.at 34. The plurality decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld found that the
AUMF provided authority to detain enemy combatants, including citizens, for the duration of that
conflict (at least as long as "United States troops are still involved in active combat in
Afghanistan") so long as detainees received some form of process, as demanded by the Geneva
Conventions. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004) (plurality opinion). This implies
not broad congressional authorization for the duration of the "War on Terrorism," but rather
permission for such practices until the end of hostilities in Afghanistan. Congress also passed the
USA PATRIOT Act in October 2001, but Michael Greenberger, Law Professor and Director of the
Center for Health and Homeland Security, argues this did not address the detention, extradition, and
interrogation practices that are viewed as the most abusive. See Greenberger, supra note 162, at 33.
Furthermore, Greenberger questions just how involved Congress was in the passage of the Patriot
Act. He describes it as "another example of unilateral action by the Administration, rather than a
rare instance of collaboration between the president and Congress." Id. He notes that the Justice
Department proposed the principal elements of the Act only a week following 9/11, and that
Congress reviewed it in one "cursory hearing" and voted to approve it within the following six
week period during which Congress was largely closed due to the anthrax virus scare. Id.
Greenberger adds that according to a reliable report, the House had not received a final written draft
of the Act at the time of the vote. Id.
164. 151 CONG. REc. S 12,659 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Specter). Specter
said that the Supreme Court's action did not solve the problem completely, but did initiate
momentum as Hamdan did in 2005. See id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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need to defer to Presidential power[,]', 167 but others would argue that
Congress has been unduly negligent
in their constitutional duty to check
168
power.
presidential
of
uses
the
In those years, Congress sheepishly watched as the Executive enacted
its vision of the "War on Terrorism," committing grave abuses of human
rights, including those involved in the Abu Ghraib prison scandal and
other ghastly acts. 169 As of this writing, there are approximately 395
unlawful enemy combatants being held indefinitely at the Guantdnamo
Bay Naval Base in Cuba (down from a high point of 650 in late 2002),
approximately 400-600 inmates in Bagram prison in Afghanistan, and an
estimated 14,500 at various sites in Iraq. 7 ' Inmates at Bagram live in even
harsher conditions and have fewer rights than those at Guantinamo. Many
of the Bagram detainees have been held there for several years, and none
of them have spoken with attorneys or had a chance to challenge the basis
of their detention.' 7 ' Worse off still are the "ghost detainees,"'' 7 2 the
estimated dozens of humans secreted away in "black site
167. Id.
168. See Greenberger, supra note 162, at 33 (arguing that the failure to perform this duty,
which is backed by its various war-related powers, has led not only to a "weakening of
representative government, but damage to the nation's international reputation"). See also Noah
Feldman, Who Can Check the President?,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2006, at 55 (describing the various
claims of executive power by the Bush Administration as "easily the most aggressive formulation
of presidential power in our history," and suggesting that it is essentially Congress's job to reign
in the Executive's excesses). After a trip to Guantinamo Bay, Senator Graham actually suggested
to David Addington, Vice-President Cheney's counsel, that Addington coordinate the writing of
legislation with Congress, so that the Supreme Court would be more likely to uphold it. Addington,
clutching a copy of the Constitution, replied that "the Administration didn't need congressional
authorization for what it was doing. The President had the inherent authority to handle the prisoners
any way he wanted." Jeffrey Toobin, Killing Habeas Corpus, NEW YORKER, Dec. 4, 2006, at 46.
169. Joseph Lelyveld, No Exit, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 15, 2007, http://www.nybooks.com/
articles/19853.
170. See Adam Liptak, In Terror Cases, Administration Sets Own Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
27, 2005, at Al; see also Dana Priest, CIA Holds TerrorSuspects in Secret Prisons,WASH. POST,
Nov. 2, 2005, at Al.
171. See Tim Golden & Eric Schmitt, A Growing Afghan Prison Rivals Bleak Guantnamo,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2006, at Al.
172. See Human Rights Watch, The United States "Disappeared":The CIA's Long-Term
"Ghost Detainees" (Oct. 2004), at 5, available at http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/usa/us1004/
usl004.pdf; see also ACLU, Extraordinary Rendition [hereinafter ExtraordinaryRendition],
http://www.aclu.org/safefree/extraordinaryrendition/22201 res20051206.html; Report Committee
on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Council of Europe (Rapporteur Dick Marty), Alleged Secret
Detentionsand Unlawful Inter-StateTransfers ofDetaineesInvolving Councilof Europe Member
States, June 12, 2006, http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=-/Documents/WorkingDocs/DocO6/
EDOC10957.htm (describing participation and cooperation of various Council of Europe member
states in the CIA's "extraordinary rendition" program).
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prisons"-undisclosed CIA-run locations scattered throughout the world.
These prisoners have disappeared "like the victims of a Third World
dictatorship; they have never been registered with the International Red
Cross, provided with a legal review of their cases or allowed to
communicate with the outside world."' 7 3 The kind of treatment these
detainees are subjected to remains a matter of mystery and grave
concern.1 74 All told, Human Rights First estimates (based on released
government figures) that between 60,000 and 70,000 persons have been
detained around the globe at some point since 2001; a figure some argue
should also "include the more than one thousand aliens, mostly Muslim,
held in the United States after the September 11 attacks, on unrelated
immigration charges or as so-called 'material-witnesses,' on orders of
Attorney General John Ashcroft."' 75
Whatever the causes of its overly long hibernation, Congress suddenly
sprang to life in the summer of 2005, in between Memorial Day and
Veteran's Day, with a flurry of legislative activity addressing the "War on
Terrorism." The members of Congress likely were energized by the
contrast presented by reports of worsening violence in Iraq with the
76
Executive's bold prophecies that the insurgency was in its final throes.
The members of Congress may also have been motivated by the U.S.
Supreme Court's decisions of the previous summer that did exercise some
check on the Executive's rampage. 17 7 Indeed, Senator Graham's statements
made it clear that his amendment was an effort to get Congress
involved
17
precisely because, in his view, Rasul had changed the law. 1

173. Editorial, Close Guantdnamo?Yes, But Keep in Mind: It's Not the Main Problem,WASH.
POST, June 22, 2006, at A28.
174. See Joanne Mariner, CIA Detainees:Firstthe Crime, Then the Cover-Up, FINDLAW, Jan.
31,2007, http://writ.news. findlaw.com/mariner/20070131 .html; seealso Jordan J. Paust, Executive
Plans andAuthorizations to Violate InternationalLaw Concerning Treatment and Interrogation
of Detainees,43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 811, 836 n.96 (2005).
175. Lelyveld, supranote 169.
176. Iraq Insurgency in "Last Throes, " Cheney Says, June 20, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/
2005/US/05/30/cheney.iraq/.
177. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004) (per O'Connor, J., for the Court, with
whom Rehnquist, C.J., Kennedy & Breyer, J.J., joined. Souter & Ginsburg, JJ., concurring in the
judgment but dissenting with the reasoning in part, and Scalia, Stevens & Thomas, JJ., dissenting);
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484 (2004) (per Stevens, J., for the Court, with whom Kennedy, J.,
concurred. Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
178. See 151 CONG. REC. S12,664 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Graham).
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B. Congress Slouches Toward the Trenches of the "Forever War"
One could tell the story of the Graham Amendment almost exclusively
through a separation of powers narrative, providing a dramaturgical
description of the not so delicate ballet danced between the coordinate
branches around the issue of terrorism and national security. 79 In fact,
Senator Graham himself colorfully portrayed his amendment and that of
Senator McCain's (on prohibiting torture and abusive treatment of
Department of Defense detainees) as constructive interventions into the
Executive's campaign in the "War on Terrorism ' ' 8 that were encouraged
by the U.S. Supreme Court itself (Graham explicitly cited Justice Scalia's
invitation in the Rasul dissent for Congress to involve itself more
assertively."'). Graham repeatedly described Congress as having been
AWOL in the effort to deal with the dirty details of the "War on
Terrorism." The amendments offered by Graham, McCain, and other
members of Congress were going to help get the country back on track.'82

179. Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Rasul argues that the situation must be dealt with in
context of separation of powers. He argues for reading Johnson v. Eisentrager,339 U.S. 763, to
consider the scope of habeas "against the backdrop of the constitutional command of the separation
of powers." Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 485-86 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Kennedy
continues by stressing that Eisentragerindicates:
[T]here is a realm of political authority over military affairs where the judicial
power may not enter. The existence of this realm acknowledges the power of the
President as Commander in Chief, and the joint role of the President and the
Congress, in the conduct of military affairs. A faithful application of Eisentrager,
then, requires an initial inquiry into the general circumstances of the detention to
determine whether the Court has the authority to entertain the petition and to grant
relief after considering all of the facts presented.
Id.at 487.
180. 151 CONG. REC. S12,663 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Graham). "The
Congress does not need to give the executive branch a blank check on how to run this war." Id.
181. Senator Graham noted Scalia's invitation when he first introduced his amendment. See
151 CONG. REC. S8811 (daily ed. July 25,2005) (statement of Sen. Graham). In the first paragraph
of his dissent in Rasul, Justice Scalia all but abdicates the Court's role in dealing with the issue
entirely. SeeRasul,542 U.S. at 488-89 ("I would leave it to Congress to change § 2241, and dissent
from the Court's unprecedented holding."). See 151 CONG. REC. S8811 (daily ed. July 25,2005)
(statement of Sen. Graham).
182. Senator Graham introduced his amendment, linking it with that of Senator McCain's, as
a restoration of our national moral imperative:
It is clear to me from Abu Ghraib backward, forward, and other things we know
about that at times we have lost our way in fighting this war. What we are trying
to do in a series of amendments is recapture the moral high ground and provide
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It was likely not Justice Scalia's invitation alone that invigorated
Congress during those months. Also prompting congressional involvement
were the President's remarkably low approval ratings following new
convincing evidence that the Administration had used false intelligence to
mislead the nation into the war in Iraq.' 83 Other reports about the use of
"extraordinary rendition" of individuals to clandestine terror facilities
located in the former Soviet gulag system and across eastern Europe
(known as "black site" prisons) also gave Congress new impetus to
involve itself."4 This executive branch misuse of power presumably
instigated the amendment to the Defense Authorization Act of 2006 by
Senator Kerry. Senator Kerry's Amendment required the Administration
to disclose to the Senate Intelligence Committee the location and nature of
all Department of Defense detention facilities all over the world.185 Other
amendments presented in response to gross unilateral action by the
Administration include McCain's on interrogation techniques,18 6 and the
Iraq war exit strategy amendments proposed by Senators Reid, Levin, and
Warner. 187 Strife arose over the McCain Amendment when Vice President
Cheney demanded that the Amendment exempt the CIA from the torture
prohibition. President Bush threatened to veto the legislation if Cheney's
demands were not met. All this political strong-arming forced Senate

guidance to our troops. That is why Senator McCain's amendment, which I
cosponsored, is so important, and it passed by voice vote.
151 CONG. REc. S 12,655 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Graham).
183. See James Gerstenzang, GOP Pressure Over Detainee Policy Leads to Defense Bill
Delay, L.A. TIMES (July 27, 2005), at A14 (implying that Senator Graham and Senator McCain's
Amendments "suggest a growing independence among Senate Republicans as President Bush
struggles with declining support for the war in Iraq as well as an investigation into the involvement
of top White House aides" in the disclosure of Ambassador Joseph Wilson's wife as a CIA agent).
184. See Priest, supranote 170.
185. 151 CONG. REc. S 12,645-46 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Kerry). Kerry's
Amendment No. 2507 requires the President to ensure that the government complies with the
authorization, reporting, and notification requirements of Title V of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C § 413) and in particular to report to the members of the Senate Intelligence
Committee. Id.
186. Note the popularity ofMcCain's Amendment (90-9) versus Graham's (49-42, originally).
IfGraham's Amendment passed un-amended, then it would render McCain's meaningless. Senator
Kyl clarified by stating that, with or without his changes, McCain's Amendment is largely
meaningless because it does not create a private cause of action. 151 CONG. REc. S 12,660 (daily
ed. Nov. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
187. See 151 CONG. REc. S12,756-63 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 2005) (statements of Sen. Warner
& Sen. Levin).

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 18

Majority Leader Bill Frist to postpone consideration of the $491-billion
defense authorizations bill until September.' 8
We have since learned that despite Congress's efforts, the Executive
had its way in the end. The Executive, particularly the Vice-President's
counsel, David S. Addington, and his interlocutors in the Office of Legal
Counsel in the Justice Department, had pushed so hard against the McCain
amendment, which sought to outlaw "cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment," because they were trying to get official sanction over policies
it had already approved in secret. 89 Though the Justice Department
declared torture "abhorrent" in a December 2004 legal opinion it
subsequently issued two secret opinions in February 2005 and later in
2005. The first opinion officially sanctioned barraging terror suspects with
a combination of painful and physical tactics, while the second opinion
declared, no doubt disingenuously, that none of the CIA interrogation
methods violated the standard of "cruel, inhuman and degrading"
'
treatment. 90
Though conventional doctrinal analysis correctly places the Graham
Amendment squarely within a debate about separation of powers,' 9 ' we
cannot be too quick to separate that discussion from a broader discussion
about the depravity of justice within American society more generally. In
this view, Senator Graham's Amendment cannot be seen as an isolated
assault against the law but rather as part of a cultural movement to
impoverish the very concept of justice and rule of law in the United
States. 19 2 This broader view may be the key to understanding how the DTA
passed; congresspeople, like ordinary Americans, have grown accustomed
to taking the jaundiced view of the law for granted.

188. Gerstenzang, supranote 183.
189. See, e.g., Scott Shane et al., Secret U.S. Endorsement of Severe Interrogations,N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 4, 2007, at Al (exposing the Executive's secret endorsement of severe interrogation
methods).
190. Id.
191. See, e.g., Greenberger, supra note 162; Sunstein, supranote 23.
192. See Neil Kinkopf, Furious George, LEGAL AFF., Sept./Oct. 2005 (describing the
ascendance of the "exclusivity view" of the Constitution, manifest in the belligerence of the Office
of the Legal Counsel in the last several Republican administrations, which views the Constitution
as dividing power into separate spheres controlled by the separate branches, and linking this to a
preference for a government in which coordination, and thus "ambitious federal programs" are
impeded, thereby forcing Americans to "rely on the private sector to provide necessities like health
care, a clean environment, and safe products and workplaces").
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V. THE GRAHAM AMENDMENT

A. The Legal Apparatus at Guantenamo
President Bush's November 2001 Military Order established the
authorization for detaining individuals determined by the President to be
suited for such detention in "an appropriate location designated by the
Secretary of Defense outside or within the United States."' 93 Pursuant to
another Military Order in January 2002, shortly after the start of Operation
Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, the United States started to transfer
hundreds of captured individuals to Guantdnamo Bay. Since that time, the
United States has held these prisoners at Guantdnamo Bay without charge
as unlawful enemy combatants.194 Initially, administrative review boards
determined the status of these detainees, but none of the review boards
released any prisoners. In 2003, the Department of Defense issued further
directives governing the procedures by which military was to determine
the guilt or innocence of those detained at Guantinamo Bay.195 On July 7,

193. Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, supra note 34.
194. The argument in support of this status is that these individuals do not meet the criteria
of those deserving prisoner of war status as defined under Article 4(2) of the Third Geneva
Conventions (1949). Geneva Convention (III) art. 4(2), Aug. 12, 1949. The term, unlawful enemy
combatant, in fact, derives from the pre-Geneva Conventions 1942 Quirincase discussed above in
which the Supreme Court upheld the use of military commission for German saboteurs captured
on American soil. See supranotes 28-31 and accompanying text. President Bush's Military Order
of Nov. 13, 2001 defined these individuals who were to be subject to detention at an "appropriate
location designated by the Secretary of Defense outside or within the United States," as follows:
any individual who is not a United States citizen with respect to whom I determine
from time to time in writing that (1) there is reason to believe that such individual,
at the relevant times, (i) is or was a member of the organization known as al
Qaida; (ii) has engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit, acts of
international terrorism, or acts in preparation therefor[e], that have caused,
threaten to cause, or have as their aim to cause, injury to or adverse effects on the
United States, its citizens, national security, foreign policy, or economy; or (iii)
has knowingly harbored one or more individuals described in subparagraphs (i)
or (ii) of subsection 2(a)(l) of this order; and (2) it is in the interest of the United
States that such individual be subject to this order.
Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, supra note 34.
195. See Administrative Review Procedures for Enemy Combatants in the Custody of the
Department of Defense at Guanthnamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba, Department of Defense Order, May
11, 2004, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/May2004/ d20040518gtmoreview.pdf;
Military Commission [sic] Instructions issued by the Department ofDefense during 2003 and 2004,
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2004, the week after the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Rasul v. Bush, the
Bush Administration initiated the Combatant Status Review Tribunals
(CSRTs)to review whether those detained at Guantnamo had in fact been
properly classified as enemy combatants.'96 In the order, Deputy Secretary
of Defense Paul Wolfowitz determined that enemy combatants included
individuals "supporting" Taliban or al-Qaida forces "or associated forces,"
"includ[ing] any person who has committed a belligerent act or has
directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces."' 97 The
Secretary of the Navy was appointed to run the CSRTs.198 As a result, most
of those detained at Guantinamo had their CSRT review almost two years
after arrival.' 99 This nearly indefinite detention stands in stark contrast to
the timeline and process of status review required by the Geneva
Conventions."°

availableat http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/policy/dod/mil-co niission-instructions
2003.htm (last visited July 16, 2007).
196. See supra note 192.
197. Deputy Secretary for Defense, Memorandum: Order Establishing Combatant Status
Review Tribunal, July 7,2004, availableat http://www.dod.gov/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.
pdf.
198. Secretary of the Navy, Memorandum: Implementation of Combatant Status Review
Tribunal Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at Guantinamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba, July
29, 2004, availableat http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040730comb.pdf.
199. A U.S. government press release of June 16, 2002, noted the total number of detainees
was 536 persons, while a subsequent press release of August 5, 2002, noted that 34 individuals
arrived that day, increasing the total of detainees to 598. See Center for Constitutional Rights,
Letter, Update to Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 1 n. 1, availableat http://www.
ccr-ny.org/v2/legal/SeptemberlIlth/docs/08-22-02updatetolACHR.pdf. This accounting of
prisoners at Guantdnamo Bay leaves a gap of 28 additional prisoners who are not accounted for in
any press release or official notification. Id.
200. Under Article 5 of the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War, hearings are intended to happen by a competent tribunal at the site of capture, i.e., on the
field of battle, to make an initial determination, relying on the immediate circumstances of capture,
as to a captured individual's status (POW, innocent civilian, or civilian security threat). See Daryl
A. Mundis, The Use of Military Commissions to Prosecute Individuals Accused of Terrorist Acts,
96 AM. J. INT'L L. 320, 325 (2002). Under the Geneva Conventions and U.S. military regulations,
"combatants" include those individuals engaged in hostile activities at the time of capture whose
detention ends at the conclusion of conflict. For arguments criticizing the sufficiency of process by
the commissions, see Harold Honjuh Koh, The CaseAgainst the Military Commissions, 96 AM. J.
INT'L L. 337, 338-39 (2002); Mundis, supra, at 328 (arguing that "the military commissions will
be difficult to reconcile with the U.S. obligations under the Geneva Convention"). The InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights in fact demanded that the United States take
Precautionary Measures to "have the legal status of the detainees at GuantAnamo Bay determined
by a competent tribunal." Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Pertinent Parts of
Decision on Request for PrecautionaryMeasures Mar. 12, 2002, www.photius.com/rogue_
nations/guantanamo.html.
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B. HidingBodies
As of November 2004, the International Committee of the Red Cross
counted 550 detainees at Guantanamo.2 1' The military has long admitted
that it had been holding innocent civilians at Guantdnamo for nearly four
years; the deputy commander of Guantdnamo, General Martin Lucenti,
stated as early as October 2004 that "[m]ost of these guys weren't fighting.
They were running. 2 2 In January 2005, still months before Graham's
Amendment, the Wall Street Journalreported, "American commanders
acknowledge that many prisoners shouldn't have been locked up here in
the first place because they weren't dangerous and didn't know anything
of value. 'Sometimes, we just didn't get the right folks,' says Brig. Gen.
Jay Hood, Guantanamo's current commander."2 °3
Indeed, evidence had emerged as early as August 2002 that a
substantial number of those detained at Guantinamo had not been captured
in Afghanistan. 2° Subsequent habeas petitions have revealed that
individuals were turned over to the U.S. military in countries as
geographically diverse as Bosnia, Gambia, Zambia, Egypt, and
elsewhere. 2 5 Later in the month, Pakistani officials demanded the release
of all fifty-eight of their citizens, whom they did not consider to be alQaida leaders, a view reportedly shared by other countries at the time.20 6
A majority of those detained never committed a single hostile act against
the United States. In fact, careful studies of Defense Department records
indicate that, "[i]n reality, more than 55% of those detained in
Guantinamo are not accused of ever having committed a single hostile act
against the United States or its coalition forces[,]" and furthermore, that
"[o]nly 8% of the detainees were characterized by the DOD as 'al Qaeda
fighters.' Of the remaining detainees, 40% have no definitive connection

201. Neil A. Lewis, Red CrossFinds DetaineeAbuse in Guantanamo,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30,
2004, at Al.
202. See Center for Constitutional Rights, Graham Myths [hereinafter Graham Myths],
www.ccr-ny.org/v2/reports/listing.asp?offset- 150 (last visited Nov. 11, 2005).
203. Christopher Cooper, DetentionPlan:In Guantanamo,PrisonersLanguish in Sea ofRed
Tape; Inmates waitingto Be Freedare Caughtin Uncertainty;ImprovisingA long the Way-A Split
Over Interrogations,WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 2005, at Al.
204. See Ian Burrel, War on Terror:Britons at Camp Delta Make a Sorry Bunch of Warriors,
INDEPENDENT (London), Aug. 3, 2002 (one of the seven British detainees had been taken from
Zambia); Terrorin South-EastAsia: The Elusive Enemy, ECONOMIST (London), Aug. 3, 2002, at
45-46; They're on Both Sides of the Pond,ECONOMIST (London), Aug. 10, 2002.
205. Graham Myths, supra note 202.
206. Julian Borger, Call for Release of "Low-Level" Guant6namo Inmates, GUARDIAN
(London), Aug. 20, 2002.
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with al Qaeda at all and 18% have no definitive affiliation with either al
Qaeda or the Taliban."2 °7 These calls for the end of the detention no doubt
were influenced by mounting reports that the health of the inmates at
Guantdnamo was deteriorating, despite contrary claims by the U.S.
government. In fact, as of August 2002, the BBC reported that thirty
detainees had attempted suicide.2 °8 Over two years later, their detention
still apparently interminable, dozens of detainees went on a hunger
strike.2 °9
Hunger strikes began a consistent response by detainees, leading to
new policies of force-feeding by the military. 210 Later, other reports
emerged about the existence of twenty-six "ghost detainees"-those held
in total secret outside of the United States-whose existence as detainees
was never disclosed to third parties such as the International Committee
for the Red Cross.211
C. A Sleeper Amendment
Senator Graham first introduced his amendment to the Defense
Authorizations Bill of 2006 on July 25, 2005.212 He presented it as mainly
codifying the administration-implemented CSRTs to "get Congress
involved in that process so that the courts will understand that Congress
agrees with the concept of unlawful enemy combatant and that the review
process in place is a good process. ' '2 3 Disagreement over Senator

207. See Mark P. Denbeux, The 14 Myths of Guantinamo,Statement Submitted to the Senate
Armed Services Committee, Apr. 26, 2007, at 5-6 (footnotes omitted), availableat http://law.shu.
edu/media/fourteenmyths_ofgtmofinal.pdf.
208. Terror Suspects "Attempted Suicide," BBC (Aug. 15, 2002), available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/I/hi/world/americas/2194517.stm.
209. See Carol Williams, HungerStrike at Guantanamo, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2007, at 9.
210. See Tim Golden, Guantanamo DetaineesStage Hunger Strike Despite Force-Feeding
Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2007, at A12.
211. See Human Rights Watch Backgrounder, List of "Ghost Prisoners" Possibly in CIA
Custody, Nov. 30, 2005, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/l 1/30/usdoml2109.htm.
212. 151 CONG. REC. S8811 (daily ed. July 25, 2005) (statement of Sen. Graham).
213. Id. The Senator stated that his amendment:
allows Congress to define "unlawful enemy combatant" in a very flexible way
similar to what is being used at Guantanamo Bay now. It incorporates the
[w]e
procedures that are used to classify and review enemy combatant status ....
are codifying that procedure. We are accepting most of it. We are tweaking the
definition in line with Supreme Court cases that have reviewed this whole subject
matter.
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McCain's proposed amendment to prohibit torture and abuse of
Department of Defense detainees forced consideration of the Defense
Authorization bill until after the summer.21 4
In a deft move out of a saboteur's playbook, Graham re-introduced his
proposals as a sleeper amendment towards the end of the congressional
session on November 11, 2005.215 November 11, 2005 was Veterans Day,
and the Senate was about to retire for the holiday weekend. The previous
morning of November 10th, the executive branch brought motions to the
D.C. District Court seeking to stay the habeas claims until procedural
issues were resolved on appeal. Towards the end of the day on November
11 th, hours away from a holiday weekend, Senator Graham proposed an
amendment that differed significantly from the amendment he proposed
during the summer months.
Unlike his previous proposals of July 2005, his new amendment was
modified to include a section D, "Judicial Review of Detention of Enemy
Combatants," which stated under subsection (1)(e): "'No court, justice, or
judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider an application for a writ
of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien outside the United
States ...who is detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba."' 21 6 The last detainee of the over 600 individuals incarcerated
at Guantanamo arrived in September 2004. The use of the CSRTs had
ceased by March 2005, months before Graham's amendment was
introduced.2 7 Therefore, when the Senator re-proposed his amendment in
November with the new section, its only practical effect would have been
to strip federal courts of their jurisdiction over pending and future habeas
petitions.21 8
Senator Bingaman, who opposed the Amendment, noted in speaking
before the vote that there had been no hearings on Graham's amendment
in either the Senate Judiciary Committee or the Armed Services
Committee, either of which would have been a better forum for
considering this type of proposal. According to Senator Bingaman, "[i]t
would be a terrible mistake for us to do this sort of as a by-the-way kind
of amendment on a Thursday afternoon as we are preparing to leave for
214. See 151 CONG. REc. S 12,667 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Graham).
215. Id.
216. 151 CONG. REc. S12,655 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Graham)
(introducing text of Amendment No. 2515).
217. Sgt. Sara Wood, Administrative Tribunals to Begin for High- Value Guantanamo
Detainees, AM. FORCES PRESS SERVICE, Mar. 6, 2007, http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/
library/news/2007/03/sec-070306-afps01 .htm.
218. As the Center for Constitutional Rights notes, "[s]ince all the CSRTs are complete,
improvements in the procedures will be academic." Graham Myths, supranote 202.
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the weekend., 219 The vote, which passed 49-42, occurred in the absence of
several senators.22 ° Considering that several of those absent were
Republican Senators, and only five Democrats voted for the Amendment,
it is unclear whether the absent members would have changed the
outcome. Either way, the point is that Graham attempted to sneak a fast
one by Congress.
As Senator Bingaman points out, the profound effect of the
surreptitiously introduced clause cannot be overstated. Senator Graham
proposed to strip federal courts of their jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus
petitions from detainees at Guantinamo Bay.22 ' In so doing, Graham's
Amendment threatened to make irrelevant the McCain Amendment
prohibiting torture in all Department of Defense interrogations. The
McCain Amendment passed just prior to the Graham Amendment debates.
The Graham Amendment would have rendered the McCain Amendment
useless because if you cannot access the courts, you cannot allege
mistreatment at the hands of those detaining you; thus, the McCain
Amendment would become a right without a form of relief (and, as noted
above, the McCain amendment did not provide its own cause of action).
The intense criticism of Graham's maneuvering forced him to entertain
negotiations 222 leading to a compromise amendment, co-sponsored with
fellow Republican Senator Jon Kyl (R-A.Z.) and Democratic Senator Carl
M. Levin (D.-Mich.), which passed the Senate 84 to 14.223 The subsequent
enemy combatant legislation-the MCA-passed the224Senate on September
28, 2006, by a count of 65-34, with one abstention.

219. 151 CONG. REC. S12,657 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Bingaman).
220. See 151 CoNG. REC. S12,667 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Vitter); A
Compromise With Caveats, WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 2005, at A18 (describing the passage of the
eventual compromise amendment between Senator Graham, Jon Kyl (R-Ariz.), and Carl M. Levin
(D-Mich.) as a "momentous change in policy governing the power of the courts, following
backroom bargaining that bypassed normal Judiciary Committee consideration").
221. Republican Senator Arlen Specter, chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, described
it as "'a sophisticated, blatant attempt at court-stripping."' See Jeremy Brecher & Brendan Smith,
Ban Torture or Protect Torturers?, NATION, Dec. 2, 2005, http://www.thenation.com/doc/
20051219/brecher.
222. See id.(noting that "Newsweek has reported that Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and
White House Counsel Harriet Miers were also in on the negotiations").
223. Neil A. Lewis, U.S. to Seek Dismissalof Guantanamo Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2006,
at Al1; see also Ian Wallach, No Habeasat Guantinamo?The Executive and the Dubious Tale of
the DTA, JURIST, Mar. 6,2006, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/fonimy/ 2006/03/no-habeas-at-guantanamoexecutive-and.php.
224. See S. 3930 [109th]: Military Commissions Act of 2006, http://www.govtrack.us/
congress/bill.xpd?bill=s1 09-3930.
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D. Militant Metaphors
As outlined above, several images have persisted over the last several
decades contributing to a quite popular, though grossly inaccurate, view
of the justice system in America. These metaphors and stock images have
been the foot soldiers in an all-encompassing campaign-a cultural
movement-to restrict the possibilities of justice in the United States,
particularly for marginalized segments of the population. As discussed
above, these militant metaphors have attacked the judicial process in
several significant sectors of American law: tort and product liability,
criminal process, immigration law, employment discrimination, and even
the rare cases of corporate accountability for gross violations of human
rights. We need not pay that close attention to Senator Graham's speeches
in support of his amendment to hear his deployment of these militant
metaphors in new, but not altogether unfamiliar, uniforms.225
One of the most profound images provided by Senator Graham is a nottoo-distant cousin to the conniving claimant who appeared in jokes
throughout the early twentieth century before being de-ethnicized and
diffused into broader caricatures of lawyers and an atmosphere of
litigiousness within American society. The image of the conniving
claimant was that of an individual, usually a foreigner, who took
advantage of society-who abused the well-ordered system
of rule of
22 6
law-to pursue personal gains at the expense of the nation.
Senator Graham has refashioned the conniving claimant into the
conniving detainee and the lawyers who help him. There are several
components to this complex image. First, the claim made is frivolous and
undeserving. 27 Second, allowing the courts to hear the claim and awarding
damages for such a claim undermines the law because it misuses it,
thereby taking advantage of all the honest people who rely on the system.
In this instance, Graham claims that allowing habeas petitions radically

225. Janet Malcolm, covering the Senate's confirmation hearings for Justices Roberts and
Alito, described Graham as "a Southerner [who] speaks at Northern speed, and to highly
entertaining effect," and as having a "gift for comedy-he delivers his lines as if he were working
a night-club crowd-and exudes an air of cynicism that right wing politicians do not usually permit
themselves, and that is very refreshing." See Janet Malcom, Annals of the Senate: The Art of
Testifying-The ConfirmationHearings as Theatre, NEW YORKER, Mar. 13, 2006, at 73.
226. See supra text accompanying note 69.
227. Echoing Orrin Hatch on immigration habeas: "Currently, we have an absurd situation in
which criminal aliens are entitled to more review and have more opportunities to file frivolous
dilatory appeals than non-criminal aliens." Orrin G. Hatch, Floor Statement: "The Fairness in
Immigration Litigation Act," May 19,2004, http://hatch.senate.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=Press
Releases.View&PressRelease id=1052.
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changes 200 years of the law of armed conflict. 22 Third, the proliferation

of such claims changes the normative fabric of our society; in allowing
such claims, the courts provide incentive to the behavior and cause the
claims to multiply, which can lead to a breakdown of trust and a corrosion
of the ties that bind our social relations and institutions. These claims also
clog our courts, slowing the system, and undermining our productive
capacities because of the increased associated costs. Finally, recognizing
the legitimacy of the conniving claimant/detainee necessarily devalues the
status of our own citizenship; our rights, it is argued, are cheapened and
trampled upon as their rights are recognized.229 In other words, granting
detainees privileges due to the fact that they are human beings recognizes
their humanity, which necessarily insults our own because detainees are
evil and are not due this respect nor protection under the law. Moreover,
allowing access to the courts creates the false impression that the "War on
Terrorism" should operate in the criminal context, rather than the extralegal, "forever war" paradigm the Bush Administration has imposed.230
1. Clogging the Courts with Frivolous Claims
Senator Graham and his allies recast the familiar story of frivolous
claims in terms of national security while simultaneously weaving in
aspects of the litigation explosion myth from other legal contexts, such as
criminal habeas petitions and medical malpractice suits. He establishes the
first element of the frivolity of the claims by distorting the true
significance of the habeas corpus petitions. Senator Graham fails to
discuss the petitions challenging the factual bases of prisoners' detentions,
which without federal court intervention are exclusively handled by the
Administration through the CSRTs. Instead, Graham focuses on those
petitions that include complaints against the conditions of detention, which
a federal court can always use its discretion to dismiss. He creates an
image of a deluge of "hundreds of habeas petitions that will be clogging
the Federal courts[,]" thereby not only slowing up our normal judicial

228. Senator Graham stated, "Here is what has happened. If you want to give a Guantinamo
Bay detainee habeas corpus rights as a U.S. citizen, you [have] changed the law of armed conflict
like no one else in the history of the world." 151 CONG. REC. S 12,656 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 2005)
(statement of Sen. Graham).
229. Senator Graham stated "They are not entitled to this status. They are not criminal
defendants. And here is what they are doing in our courtrooms." 151 CONG. REc. S12,656 (daily
ed. Nov. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Graham).
230. Senator Graham stated clearly that "[w]ith my amendment, which we voted on last week,
the concern I had was we were about to criminalize the war because of the Rasul case." 151 CONG.
REC. S12,753 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 2005) (statement of Sen. Graham).
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process with unmeritorious claims, but also preventing the efficient
running of Guantdnamo Bay.2 3 ' As he catalogues the claims, he attempts,
not unlike President Reagan's speech about the psychic and the CAT scan,
to portray them as so outrageous as to approach the comically absurd:
A Canadian detainee who threw a grenade that killed an army
medic in a firefight and who came from a family of longstanding alQaida ties moved for preliminary injunction forbidding
interrogation of him or engaging in cruel, inhumane, or degrading
treatment of him. It was a motion to a Federal judge to regulate his
interrogation in military prison.
Another example. A Kuwaiti detainee sought a court order that
would provide dictionaries in contradiction of Gitmo's force
protection policy and that their counsel be given high-speed Internet
access at their lodging on the base and be allowed to use classified
DOD telecommunications facilities, all on the theory that otherwise
their right to counsel is unduly burdened.
This is one of my favorites. There was a motion by a high-level
al-Qaida detainee complaining about base security procedures,
speed of mail delivery, and he is seeking an order that he be
transferred to the least onerous conditions at Gitmo and asking the
court to order that Gitmo allow him to keep any books and reading
materials sent to him and to report to the court on his opportunities
for exercise, communication, recreation, and worship.
Can you imagine Nazi prisoners suing us about their reading
material?
Two medical malpractice claims have come out of this.
Here is another great one. There was an emergency motion
seeking a court order requiring Gitmo to set aside its normal
security policies and show detainees DVDs that are purported to be
family videos.
232
Where does this stop? It is never going to stop.
As Graham portrays them, these claims are frivolous and
unmeritorious.
In a deft move, Senator Kyl, a strong advocate of Graham's
Amendment, slyly blends in an example of an "outrageous" petition from
the criminal habeas context with the enemy combatant issue. He also
mixes in an allusion to the medical malpractice suits, blurring the line
231.
232.

151 CONG. REc. S12,659 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 2005).
151 CONG. REc. S12,656 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Graham).
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between federal criminal inmate and enemy combatant. In mixing these
areas, Senator Kyl reinforces the wisdom-and inherent power-wielded
by Congress in limiting habeas through AEDPA in 1996, while
simultaneously using that gesture to support restricting habeas now:
But what we have gotten rid of are these hundreds of habeas
petitions that will be clogging the Federal courts. We have already
seen them making medical malpractice claims against the doctors,
saying they want one kind of food as opposed to another kind of
food and so on. It is going to get like it did with prisoners. One of
the real-life cases that came out of Arizona that we tried to take care
of in 1996 law is a prisoner said: I want chunky peanut butter, I
don't want creamy peanut butter. And that was the habeas petition.
You have a right to question food in a habeas petition. Do we want
our Federal courts clogged with terrorists making these kind of
petitions? No.233
Of course, these kinds of petitions are not the ones over which the real
debate centers, and they are not "clogging" our courts. In fact, all 160
petitions have been made to one court-the U.S. District Court for the
District234 of Columbia-in coordinated proceedings before a magistrate

judge.

233. 151 CONG. REC. S12,659-60 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
234. GrahamMyths, supranote 202; see also Wallach, supranote 223. Wallach notes that the
stock quote regarding the "floodgates of litigation" was circulated and appeared in many of the
letters by military personnel Senator Graham presented into the congressional record. Wallach
argues that contrary to the letters produced by Senator Bingaman, in which the military personnel
discussed the importance of habeas to the military-an issue with which they are familiar-the
letters introduced by Senator Graham featured military personnel discussing "the efficiency of the
federal court system, an issue with which military leaders have no expertise." Id. Wallach also
attempts to shed some light on Graham's "fuzzy" math in this regard:
As of February 17, 2006, there were approximately 5,287 cases pending in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia. And approximately 180
of those were GuantAnamo habeas actions. The cases that amount to the alleged
"floodgates" comprise point zero three four percent (.034%) of the cases pending
in that Court.
But more appropriate math would take into consideration Senator Graham's
statement that "there are 160 habeas corpus petitions in Federal Courts throughout
the United States." To my knowledge, there are about 180 habeas petitions, all of
which were filed in one court-the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia. If we assume that Senator Graham is correct and cases could be
brought "throughout the United States", then the math gets even less "floodgate"
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The real debate is over the ability of individuals who have been
detained for years without real due process of law to access federal courts
to challenge the factual basis of their detention. The facts (obtained
through Freedom of Information Act requests and details revealed through
the habeas corpus petitions to date) are that the prisoners in Guantdnamo
have been
held in extreme solitary confinement for periods exceeding a year;
deprived of sleep for days and weeks; exposed to prolonged
temperature extremes; beaten; subjected to severe sensory
deprivation or over-stimulation; threatened with extraordinary
rendition; tortured in foreign countries or at U.S. military bases
abroad before transfer to Guantdnamo; sexually harassed and raped
or threatened with rape; deprived of medical treatment for serious
conditions, or allowed treatment only on the condition that they
"cooperate" with interrogators; subjected to injections of unknown
medications; and routinely "short-shackled" (wrists and ankles
bound together and to the floor).235
The non-frivolity of these allegations cannot be overstated, and it is
surprising that senators would dare mention these practices in the same
breath as the practice of depriving detainees of chunky peanut butter, let
alone substitute one for the other as if they were morally equivalent.
2. Suing Our Soldiers
Continuing to allow detainees access to our courts for these frivolous
claims, Graham argues, weakens our national moral resolve and our ability
to protect ourselves: 23 6 "if we do not rein in prisoner abuse, we are going
to lose the war. But if we do not rein in legal abuse by prisoners, we are
going to undermine our ability to protect ourselves., 23 7 Graham loosely
mentions U.S. violations of basic human rights at Abu Ghraib,

like. The DC District Court is a busy court. If we assume every District Court in
the nation is half as active as the DC District Court and has only 2,643 cases, and
if there are 94 District Courts, then there would be a total of about 248,442 (2,643
times 94) cases in federal courts. The 180 habeas actions would comprise about
point zero zero zero seven two four five percent (.0007245%) of the Courts' cases.
Id.
235. Graham Myths, supra note 202.
236. See 151 CONG. REc. S 12,663 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Graham).
237. Id.
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Guant~namo, and elsewhere, which weaken our international reputation
and undermine our efforts in Iraq, and in the same breath, addresses the
petitions for review of the conditions that enable such abuses in an attempt
to morally equate the prisoners' pleas for relief with the acts of abuse. A
certain unity of discourse emerges when we examine Justice Scalia's
arguments in his dissent in Rasul. Scalia decries the majority's decision as
an "irresponsible overturning of settled law in a matter of extreme
'
importance to our forces currently in the field."238
Senator Graham was not satisfied, however, with merely raising the
specter of weakened defenses. He used a rhetorical move akin to President
Reagan's linkage of the psychic and the CAT scan scandal leading (quite
improbably) to "babies not being delivered" because the litigation drove
up the costs of medical practice to an unsustainable level. 239 Graham
continually raged against detainees suing our soldiers for frivolous claims:
"[i]t is not fair to our troops fighting in the [W]ar on [T]error to be sued in
every court in the land by our enemies based on every possible
complaint., 240 Elsewhere he pleaded: "[d]o not give the terrorists, the
enemy combatants, the people who blow up folks at weddings, who fly
planes into the Twin Towers, the ability to sue our own troops all over the
' Not unlike Vice President Cheney's
country for any and everything."241
claims that those who accuse the Bush Administration of having misled
the nation into war are "morally reprehensible" and foremost harm our
soldiers,242 Senator Graham contends that allowing habeas petitions is a
direct assault against our soldiers and weakens our capacity to protect
ourselves. A vote to restrict the right to habeas corpus then, is a vote for
our troops; restricting habeas becomes the patriotic thing to do:"[l]et us
stand up for our troops in a reasonable way, protect them from abuses, and

238. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466,489 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting). There would appear to
be some precedent for such thinking-that somehow access to the courts weakens our
defenses-which Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Rasul points out. Kennedy explains that the
EisentragerCourt considered the extent to which granting jurisdiction for habeas petitions to the
Germans detained in Lansberg Castle in occupied Germany, would "'hamper the war effort and
bring aid and comfort to the enemy."' Id. at 486 (Kennedy, J., quoting Eisentrager,339 U.S. 763,
at 779).
239. Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell, supra note 27, at 727.
240. Eric Schmitt, Senate Approves Limiting Rights of U.S. Detainees,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10,
2005, at A6; see also 151 CONG. REc. S 12662-63 (2005).
241. 151 CONG. REc. S12,663 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Graham).
242. Press Release, Office of Vice President Dick Cheney, Vice President's Remarks on the
War on Terror (Nov. 21, 2005), availableat http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/l 1/
20051121-2.html.
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'
protect them from the court suits filed by the people they are fighting."243
Restricting habeas, in other words, protects the American way of life. As
in the tort reform context, suing has become a sin, a betrayal of the moral
community of the nation.
Graham complains that lawyers are complicit in this attack on our
moral resolve and actual self-defense capabilities. The detainees' lawyers
are made to appear analogous to, the plaintiff's lawyers who undermine
our productive capacities through product liability suits,2" slowing down
the economy and giving comfort to our economic enemies, competitors
from other countries. Quoting civil and human rights advocate Michael
Ratner of the Center for Constitutional Rights, Graham points out how
paralyzing lawyers' and courts' interventions can be:

We have over one hundred lawyers now from big and small
firms working to represent these detainees. Every time an attorney
goes down there, it makes it that much harder for the U.S. military
to do what they're doing. You can't run an interrogation... with
attorneys. What are they going to do now that we're getting court
orders to get more lawyers down there? [end Michael Ratner quote]
[Graham:] Know what. The people at Gitmo are asking that
same question: What are we going to do? It is impossible to
interrogate people with this much court intervention. We are
undermining the role Gitmo plays in helping our own national
security.245

243. 151 CONG. REc. S12,667 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Graham).
244. See Galanter, Oil Strike in Hell, supra note 27, at 737 (stating "[a]ssertions that the tort
system inhibits the creation ofjobs and the economic health of the country are so commonplace as
to pass without notice. However, proof of such effects is not easy to find.").
245. 151 CONG. REc. S12,657 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Graham). In
arguing against the counter-amendment proposed by Senator Bingaman, Senator Graham
emphasized this further, though he distorts legal history in the process:
Never in the history of the law of armed conflict has a military prisoner, an enemy
combatant, been granted access to any court system, Federal or otherwise, to have
a Federal judge come in and start running the prison and determining what is in
bounds and what is out. The military is the proper body to determine who an
enemy combatant is and how to run a war and how to interrogate people, not
Federal judges who are not trained in the art of military science.
151 CONG. REc. S12,731 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Graham).
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Indeed, Senator Graham reminds us that "[c]ivilian judges cannot run this
war," and that fighting this war is a soldier's job.246 This is why, Graham
argues, the Senate needs to take action; it can no longer afford to sit on the
sidelines, cowardly letting the lawyers destroy our chances of survival:
[d]oes this body want to be the first Senate in the history of the
United States to confer rights on a POW and an enemy combatant
to sue the troops who are trying to protect us? There are 160 cases
down there. There are going to be 300 cases. They are going to ruin
the ability to get intelligence because we in the Senate haven't
acted, and we need to act.247
Thus, the presence of lawyers is seen as detrimental to the war effort. Too
many lawyers reap chaos; they prevent the military from running the
prison in an orderly fashion2 48 and interfere with interrogation techniques.
According to Graham, this leads to a loss of crucial intelligence that would
save American lives despite ample evidence from former Department of
Defense9 interrogators that these more abusive tactics simply do not
24

work.

It is important to see these statements in a broader context, one that
recalls one of the "legal legends" with the most staying power: the popular
myth that America has 70% of the world's lawyers. 250 As Galanter reflects,
this "fact" has shown incredible resilience, and long after serious observers
concluded that it was meaningless or false, "in the media and political

246. 151 CONG. REC. S12,663 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Graham).
247. 151 CONG. REc. S 12,664 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Graham).
248. "I think you are undermining our national security because the habeas petitions are
Three hundred of them have lawyers in Federal court and
flowing out of that place like crazy ....
more to follow. We cannot run the place." 151 CONG. REc. S12,656 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 2005)
(statement of Sen. Graham).
249. 151 CONG. REC. S12,652 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Graham).
250. Galanter, Oil Strike in Hell,supranote 27, at 734-35. Dan Quayle popularized this figure
in a 1991 speech, leading to a parade of popular press that Quayle himself considers the best of his
vice-presidency. Id. Quayle picked the tidbit from obscurity and ingrained it in the national
consciousness. It was originally proffered by Chief Justice Berger as part of his general attack on
the overly litigious American society, only to be taken up by Justice O'Connor, law school deans,
Colorado Governor Lamm's diatribes about America's spiral towards doom, and even by Ross
Perot, who in blaming lawyers for the inadequate terms of his problematic contract with General
Motors, claimed, "[a]s long as two-thirds of the world's lawyers are in this country you can expect
every clause that these people will dream up. I wish more of these lawyers would become engineers
and make something." Id. (citing N.R. Kleinfield, Silence is Golden, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 29,
1990, at 54). That is, stop using the law to slow down the economy, and do something to improve
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worlds, it is served up without shame or challenge," eventually taking on
the status of "genuine global folklore," by being featured in British,
Japanese, and Singapore media as warnings of the detrimental effects on
economic production that would follow should these countries follow
America's example of fostering such an explosion in their lawyer
populations.25 '
3. "Geneva Conventions Protections on Steroids" 252-- Giving
Rights to Nazis
"This is about the rule of law. The rule of law protects people in armed
combat. This is about changing our law to give terror suspects rights of
U.S. citizens. 253
The final significant element of Senator Graham's conniving detainee
image is its disingenuous inversion of the rule of law in the name of
preservingthe rule of law. Similar to those who argue against expansive
liability and remedies at law, the argument aims at undercutting access to
justice in the name of innate fairness. Graham transforms the usual image
of the conniving claimant who cheats the system by getting an undeserved
windfall from a frivolous lawsuit into a situation in which foreigners,
aliens, terrorists, and Nazis, get undeserved rights and entitlements under
our laws through a distortion of American legal tradition and the historical
framework of the law of armed conflict.25 4 This image is an echo of similar
arguments in the criminal habeas and immigration law contexts.

251. Id. at 736-37.
252. "What is going on at Guantanamo Bay is called the Combat Status Review Tribunal,
which is the Geneva Conventions protections on steroids." 151 CONG. REc. S 12,656 (daily ed. Nov.
10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Graham). Graham used this image multiple times throughout his
senate floor arguments.
253. 151 CONG. REc. S 12,663 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Graham).
254. 151 CONG. REC. S12,665, S 12,667 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Graham).
"They are swamping the system. Americans are losing their day in court because somehow we have
allowed enemy combatants, people who have signed up to kill us all, to take us into Federal court
and sue us about everything." 151 CONG. REC. S 12,732 (daily ed. Nov. 14,2005) (statement of Sen.
Graham). Conservative commentators have echoed this language. See Andrew C. McCarthy,
Lawfare Strikes Again, NAT'L REV. ONLINE (June 12, 2007) (describing the policy effects of the
recent Fourth Circuit decision regarding U.S. citizen and alleged al-Qaida "sleeper" operative Ali
Saleh Halah al-Marri as creating a proceeding in which al-Marri "would receive lavish discovery
that could be extremely helpful to the people trying to kill us").
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There are a few derivative effects--or as Jonathan Simon phrases it,
"entailments" 255 -of this complex metaphor. First, Graham's rhetoric
' changes in
positions the U.S. Supreme Court as producing "absurd"256
"settled law," recalling the well-established conservative trope of liberal
"activist" judges who create new legal remedies otherwise not found in the
law.257 Second, it creates a hierarchy of rights, which Graham constructs
by blurring the well-established categories of American and international
legal precedent, establishing a falsely simplistic dichotomy between rightsbearing ("Americans" or "patriots") and non-rights bearing individuals
(enemy combatants). This move reinforces the Bush Administration's
imposed forever war paradigm (as opposed to alternative approaches, such
as the criminal justice system), expanding the "battlefield" to every comer
of the globe, and buttressing the civilizational battle between "us" and
"them."
In a particularly clever move, Graham positions his amendment as one
of restoring the rule of law, rather than undermining it. Even though it was
he who proposed to change the law to suit the Administration's policies
(and the U.S. Supreme Court, in Rasul, demonstrated that those policies
in fact diverged from the established rule of law) he has positioned himself
as the restorer of tradition and the rule of law. Within this construction,
those who oppose his amendment will in fact be changing the rule of law
in armed conflict, granting unprecedented rights to our enemies.25
Graham's oratory on this point is remarkable and merits quoting at length:
The question is, 4 years after 9/11, do we want to change our law
and give a terrorist, an al-Qaeda member, the ability to sue our own
troops in Federal court, all over the country, for anything and
everything? I do not. I want to treat them humanely. I want to get
good information. And I want to prosecute them within the rule of

255. See supra text accompanying note 60 (citing STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE
FOREST: LAW, LIFE & MIND 2001).

256. See infra note 255 and accompanying text.
257. This echoes Senator Feinstein's arguments about the need to scale back the ATS. See
supra Part II.C.2.
258.
Do you want to be the Senator who has changed 200 years of law? Do you want
to be the Senator who is changing the law of armed conflict to say that an enemy
combatant-someone caught on the battlefield, engaged in hostilities against this
country-is not a person in a war but a criminal and given the same rights as every
other American citizen?
151 CONG. REC. S12,662 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Graham).
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law. But I do not want to do something that is absurd and is going
to hurt our national security; that is, allowing a terrorist the ability
to go to Federal court and sue our own troops, who are fighting for
our freedom, as if they were an American citizen. Do you know
why the Nazis did not get to do that when we had them in our
charge? Because that is not the law. It has never been the law. We
caught six German saboteurs sneaking into this country, trying to
blow up part of America. They were tried. Where? In a military
commission, a military tribunal, not in a civilian court. We had
German POWs who tried to come into Federal court, and our court
said: As a member of an armed force, organized against the United
States, you are not entitled to a constitutional right of habeas
corpus. Do you want to give these terrorists habeas corpus rights
just like an average, everyday American citizen or a common
criminal to sue our own troops? Well, if you do, vote against my
amendment. If you want to get back to where we have been for 200
years, then you need to support me.259
There are so many distortions in these few lines, it is difficult to know
where to begin. But it is necessary to bring out the inaccuracies to
appreciate more fully how the rhetoric acts to sabotage legality.
First, Graham blatantly misconstrues what happened in Quirin.26 °
Contrary to what Graham claims here and elsewhere in his speeches, in
Quirinthe U.S. Supreme Court upheld the right of detained individuals to
access the civilian courts to challenge the nature of the military processes
that would determine their fates. 26 ' The Court ultimately ruled against the
enemy combatants in Quirin,but only after considering their arguments on
the merits.262 Graham also conveniently ignores In re Yamashita, which
faithfully applied Quirin in 1946.263

259. 151 CONG. REC. S12,662-63 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Graham).
260. Elsewhere he more explicitly says "[w]e didn't let German prisoners file writs. Under the
Roosevelt administration, these six people were captured. They were tried. Four were executed. A
writ of habeas corpus was not available to them. It should not have been available to them." 151
CONG. REc. S 12,664 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Graham).
261. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). In Quirin, four of the Germans were later
executed.
262. 151 CONG. REc. S 12,664 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Levin) (quoting
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 36 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).
263. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 8 (discussing Exparte Quirin). In applying Quirin to the
writ of habeas corpus sought by General Yamashita, the Court in Yamashita offered a limited scope
of review of the military commission that had found General Yamashita guilty and sentenced him
to death. The Court stated, "[t]he courts may inquire whether the detention complained of is within
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Graham also alludes to other "German POWs who tried to come into
Federal court," 2" presumably describing the petitioners of Eisentrager,the
case that the government unsuccessfully relied upon in Rasul. As noted
above, the Court distinguished the facts surrounding the detainees in
Eisentragerfrom those of Rasul, significantly noting that in Eisentrager
the POWs had already been tried by military commissions, whereas in
Rasul, the petitioners faced a potentially indefinite detention while
insisting upon their innocence.265 Still, Graham's misuse of the precedent

the authority of those detaining the petitioner." Id. at 8. The Court argued further that, by Congress
sanctioning trials of enemy aliens by military commission for offenses against the law of war, it had
recognized the accuser's right to make a defense, which could not preclude "their right to contend
that the Constitution or laws of the United States withhold authority to proceed with the trial." Id.
at9.
Justice Murphy's dissent in Yamashita is worth quoting for its eloquence and its firm defense
of the rule of law. Though Justice Murphy dissented from the Court's ultimate decision, he
applauded the majority for having taken the first and most important step toward insuring the
supremacy of law and justice in the treatment of an enemy belligerent accused of violating the laws
of war:
Jurisdiction properly has been asserted to inquire "into the cause of restraint of
liberty" of such a person. 28 U.S.C. 452. Thus the obnoxious doctrine asserted by
the Government in this case, to the effect that restraints of liberty resulting from
military trials of war criminals are political matters completely outside the arena
of judicial review, has been rejected fully and unquestionably. This does not
mean, of course, that the foreign affairs and policies of the nation are proper
subjects of judicial inquiry. But when the liberty of any person is restrained by
reason of the authority of the United States the writ of habeas corpus is available
to test the legality of that restraint, even though direct court review of the restraint
is prohibited. The conclusive presumption must be made, in this country at least,
that illegal restraints are unauthorized and unjustified by any foreign policy of the
Government and that commonly accepted juridical standards are to be recognized
and enforced. On that basis judicial inquiry into these matters may proceed within
its proper sphere.
In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 30 (1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting), quoted in 151 CONG. REC.
S12,730-31 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 2005), Ex. No. 1 [hereinafter Sullivan Letter] (letter from Dwight
H. Sullivan, Colonel, USMCR, Chief Defense Counsel, Office of Military Commissions, to Jeff
Bingaman, Senator (Nov. 14, 2005)).
264. 151 CONG. REC. S 12,663 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Graham).
265. The majority opinion in Rasul distinguished the detainees at Landsberg from those in
Guant namo; unlike the Landsberg detainees in Eisentrager,the petitioners in Rasul
are not nationals of countries at war with the United States, and they deny that
they have engaged in or plotted acts of aggression against [the United States]; they
have never been afforded access to any tribunal, much less charged with and
convicted of wrongdoing; and for more than two years they have been imprisoned
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enables him to create a moral equivalency between the "terrorists" (who
have not had a reasonable opportunity to protest this status) and
Nazis-the universal figure of ultimate evil. Beyond its holding,
Eisentrageris particularly useful to Graham's position because it begins
by "noting the 'ascending scale of rights' that courts have recognized for
individuals depending on their connection to the United States. 2 66 Graham
beats this faulty notion into the other senators' heads that, because
statutory rights are not extraterritorial, aliens are precluded from the ambit
of any statutory right to habeas, despite the U.S. Supreme Court going to
great lengths in Rasul to demonstrate that this was not the case. The
majority in Rasul, argued that because the jurisdictional holding ofAhrens
v. Clark 67-upon which Eisentrager relied-had been overruled by
Braden v. 30th Judicial CircuitCourt of Ky.,268 that Eisentragerdid not
control.269

in territory over which the United States exercises exclusive jurisdiction and
control.
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466,467 (2004). The Landsberg prisoners were clearly prisoners of war,
captured by U.S. forces in China, tried and convicted of war crimes by an American military
commission headquartered in Nanking, and incarcerated in Landsberg, which was located in
occupied Germany-not the territorial United States or a territory, like Guantinamo Bay, under
exclusive U.S. control. In response to the government's argument that Eisentragercontrols, the
Court marshaled the above facts but also distinguished the two cases based on the law in question:
Eisentragerwas decided based on entitlement to habeas corpus in the Constitution, whereas the
Rasul petitioners sought habeas on the basis of § 2241, which the Court ultimately held does not
distinguish between aliens and U.S. citizens. Id. at 468.
266. Id. at 486 (quoting Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1949)).
267. 335 U.S. 188 (1948).
268. 410 U.S. 484 (1973).
269. See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 467 (noting "[b]ecause Braden overruled the statutory predicate
to Eisentrager'sholding, Eisentragerdoes not preclude the exercise of § 2241 jurisdiction over
petitioners' claims"). In short, Eisentragerrelied on Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188, which
interpreted the habeas statute to require prisoners' presence within a district court's jurisdiction in
order to hear a habeas petition. Because the court of appeals in Eisentragerheld that the way the
Ahrens Court had construed the habeas statute created an unconstitutional gap that needed to be
filled by reference to "fundamentals," the U.S. Supreme Court in Eisentragersimilarly proceeded
from a presumption that the habeas statute as written did not confer jurisdiction, and thus, the right
must be upheld on constitutional grounds. SeeEisentrager,339 U.S. at 767. Braden then overruled
Ahrens's reading of the habeas statute, holding that because the writ of habeas acts not "upon the
prisoner who seeks relief, but upon [the] person who holds him in what is alleged to be unlawful
custody," that a district court has jurisdiction to hear a habeas petition on the basis of § 2241 "[s]o
long as the custodian can be reached by service of process .... " Braden, 410 U.S. at 494-95.
According to the Court in Rasul, "Braden thus established that Ahrens can no longer be viewed as
establishing 'an inflexible jurisdictional rule,' and is strictly relevant only to the question of the
appropriate forum, not to whether the claim can be heard at all." Rasul, 542 U.S. at 479. The
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Also deeply troubling is Graham's seemingly sloppy, but most likely
quite purposeful conflation of POW status with that of the unlawful enemy
combatants. This can be read as Graham's effort to legitimize the
indefinite detention of the individuals at Guantinamo Bay, while
simultaneously legitimizing the Administration's forever war paradigm,27 °
" ' Under
which has displaced the relevant domestic criminal law paradigm.27
the Geneva Conventions, POWs get certain protections, and can be held
until the end of a conflict. If a detained individual is determined to be an
unlawful belligerent, they are not afforded the same privileges of POWs,
majority then goes out of its way to dismiss handedly the arguments put forward by Justice Scalia's
dissent that postured "disingenuously" that Braden did in fact not overrule Ahrens's jurisdictional
holding. Id.
270. Senator Graham was very clear about this from the very start of his comments to the
Senate:
One thing we need to understand as a nation and we need to understand in the
Senate, in my opinion, is that the attack of 9/11 was an act of war. It was not a
criminal enterprise. That is an important statement to make. Every Senator needs
to understand in their own mind: Was 9/11 and were those who planned it and
those who blew up the people in Jordan yesterday common criminals or are these
people engaged in acts of terrorism and war? Let it be said clearly, in my opinion,
that the United States is at war with al Qaida and associate groups, and we have
been since 9/11.
151 CONG. REc. S12,655 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Graham). He soon reiterates:
"[w]e are at war; we are not fighting the Mafia. We are fighting an enemy desirous of taking us
down as a nation .... They are not entitled to this status. They are not criminal defendants." 151
CONG. REC. S12,656 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Graham).
271. See John Parry, Terrorism and the New Criminal Process 23-24 (Univ. of Pittsburgh
School of Law Working Paper Series, 2005).
Habeas corpus-the traditional guarantee of constitutional rights against arbitrary
state action-becomes a way of legitimizing departures from tradition. Put more
concretely, habeas functions in the "war on terror" cases as a backstop that likely
holds out only the possibility of minimal due process protections, while most of
the real criminal process-whether for detention or trial-takes place in nonArticle III forums.
Id.
Hard-headed analysis, in short, arguably suggests that we are in the exceptional
situation in which the war approach trumps the crime approach, with the result
that the new criminal process has also become the new presumption. Some things,
in other words, have changed after all, at least for a while.
Id. at 25.
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but domestic and international laws, such as Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions, still apply to them and the conditions of their
detention. This was later explicitly held by the Supreme Court in Hamdan
v. Rumsfeld.272 Graham falsely mixes unlawful enemy combatants with
POWs not only to reinforce their shared characteristics (i.e., (1) aliens, (2)
enemies of the state), but also to explode the conventional understandings
of the law of armed conflict pursuant to the Bush Administration's vision
for fighting the "War on Terrorism." He obfuscates history and legal
precedent and creates the false notion that the military and civilian court
systems have always been completely isolated from one another even for
U.S. military personnel.273 But this is patently untrue.274 In this distorted
version of the laws of war and American military code, the supposedly
significant differences between those who would be POWs and those
would be (unlawful) enemy combatants disappears: "Enemy combatants

272. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct. 2749, 2798 (2006).
Common Article 3 obviously tolerates a great degree of flexibility in trying
individuals captured during armed conflict; its requirements are general ones,
crafted to accommodate a wide variety of legal systems. But requirements they are
nonetheless. The commission that the President has convened to try Hamadan
does not meet those requirements.
Id.
273. As Senator Levin notes, quoting Hamdan verbatim: "Ex parte Quirin... provides a
compelling historical precedent for the power of civilian courts to entertain challenges that seek to
interrupt the processes of military commissions." 151 CONG. REc. S 12,664 (daily ed. Nov. 10,
2005) (statement of Sen. Levin) (quoting Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 36 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).
See also Sullivan Letter, supra note 262.
274. In Hamdan, the government unsuccessfully tried to minimize the precedential effect of
Quirin, by arguing that Schlesingerv. Councilman,420 U.S. 738 (1975), and New v. Cohen, 129
F.3d 639 (D.C. Cir. 1997) present a comity-based abstention doctrine that civilian courts should
not interfere with ongoing court-martial proceedings against citizen servicemen. Hamdan,415 F.3d
at 36. As the court notes, however, these cases offer little insight on military commissions against
alien detainees, and regardless, the concerns presented by Councilman and New involve the
military's institutional need to be battle-ready and enforce "a respect for duty and discipline without
counterpart in civilian life," which requires comity (i.e., non-interference) from the civilian courts.
Id. (quoting Councilman, 420 U.S. at 757). Hamdan does not come close to raising these issues,
the Court observes, and in any case, even operating within the Councilman and New framework,
Hamdan can avail itself of an exception to the abstention doctrine: "a person need not exhaust
remedies in a military tribunal if the military court has no jurisdiction over him." Id.(quoting New,
129 F.3d at 644). Contrary to the serviceman in Councilman(who wished to stop his court-martial
for using and selling marijuana) and in New (who wanted to stop his court-martial for
insubordination), Hamdanraised a "substantial"jurisdictional challenge: "[w]hile he does not deny
the military's authority to try him, he does contend that a military commission has no jurisdiction
over him and that any trial must be by court-martial." Id. at 37.
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are being held at Guantdnamo Bay like POWs were held in the past., ' 5 He
said, "If you are a POW in a war, you are there until the war is over. An
enemy combatant falls into that same category, and we are going to make
sure they get due process accorded under international law and then some,
' He continued
and the Congress is going to watch what happens."276
[flor those who want to turn an enemy combatant into a criminal
defendant in U.S. court and give that person the same rights as a
U.S. citizen to go into Federal court, count me out. Never in the
history of the law of armed conflict has an enemy combatant,
irregular combatant, or POW been given access to civilian court
systems to question military authority and control, except here.277
He said, "[t]hese are people caught on the battlefield as the Nazis were
caught on the battlefield., 27 One effect of this erosion of difference is that
the "battlefield" is now everywhere (Afghanistan, Zambia, or the O'Hare
airport, where Jose Padilla was picked up before being put into indefinite
detention279), and thus, the important purpose of the procedures of
Guantdnamo is to keep "terrorists" or enemy combatants off the
battlefield:
[t]he people at Guantdnamo Bay are captured as part of the war on
terror, and some of them may be running. The point is, when you
join al Qaeda, whether you stand or fight or run, you have lost your
rights to be considered anything other than what you are-an
enemy combatant taking up arms against the United States. Here is
my message to terrorists: If you join a terrorist organization taking
up arms against the United States and you get involved in combat,
you are likely to get killed. If you get captured, you will be taken
off the battlefield as2 long
as necessary to make sure our country is
°
protected from you.

275. 151 CONG. REC. S12,656 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Graham).
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. 151 CONG. REC. S12,664 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Graham).
279. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 430 (2004).
280. Sullivan Letter, supra note 262. This simplistic dichotomy is echoed again and again in
Graham's speeches: citizens against enemy combatant[s]," or crudely, "person[s] who [are] trying
to kill U.S. troops." 151 CONG. REC. S 12,663 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Graham).
In truth, the founding principle of the Bush Administration's entire legal approach is in making a
distinction between POWs on the one hand, and enemy combatants, on the other, whom, it claims,
are not POWs and are not entitled to any Geneva Convention protections. See generally Paust,
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Formulations such as these create a simplistic apartheid of rights-bearing
and non-rights bearing individuals, which flaunts the protections offered
by the Geneva Conventions to which the United States is signatory. In this
design, unlawful enemy combatants are segregated from citizens, criminal
or otherwise, who have routine access to U.S. courts, while unlawful
" ' until the
enemy combatants can be left in a tomb-like, 9.5 x 5.5 foot cell28
forever war ends. Thus, the Administration's vision of the "War on
Terrorism" is that the detainees are to be treated as both unlawful
combatants, to whom POW status and privileges do not apply, but at the
same time, as POWs (i.e., lawful combatants), in that the military
determines their status and fates without recourse to civilian justice, and
they can be kept until the end of the conflict. The most troubling effect of
this contortion of U.S. and international law is that it has even affected
U.S. citizens, as in the case of Yasser Hamdi,282 and others, as the next Part
shows.
VI. THE ENEMY COMBATANT

IS

You

As noted above, the power of conceptual metaphors is not limited to
the initial development of a concept, its conquering of the public
imagination, and its diffusion through the cultural ether. Just as significant
as these initial steps is the imposition of a concept from one sphere to
another; metaphors continue to exercise ripple effects--entailments-long
after a concept is first introduced. These entailments alter the conceptual
frameworks through which we come to understand the world and the
"governmentalities" through which we define governable subjects and
exercise power over them, i.e., how we rule ourselves as a "body
politic. '283 We have thus far traced the journey of the conniving claimant
as it traveled through various spheres of culture and took on multiple
manifestations in new contexts until it arrived in the post-9/1 1 world in the
guise of the enemy combatant/conniving detainee. This evolution does not
end here, however. Just as the "war on crime" altered other

supra note 174 (reviewing the legal arguments put forth in the various memos prepared for the
Administration by its lawyers).
281. See Graham Myths, supra note 202.
282. See supra note 171. Though the Supreme Court effectively upheld the right of a citizen,
such as Hamdi, to not be held indefinitely without charge, the Court has yet to entertain this issue
since the passage of the MCA. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2005); infra notes 295 &
297.
283. See supratext accompanying notes 56-61.
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governmentalities that would come to make use of the powerful war
metaphor, so has the enemy combatant become the dominant
governmentality in the post-9/1 1 world.
A. Hunting the New Enemy Combatants
Arguably, the enemy combatant governmentality described above,
which distinguishes between rights-bearing and non-rights bearing
individuals-or more accurately, those with relatively extensive legal
protection against the technologies of power employed in the "War on
Terrorism," and those with comparatively fewer (if any) such
protections--contributes to a general dehumanization of others not
immediately caught in the judicial apparatus of U.S. military prisons all
over the world. This dehumanization of people as enemy
combatants"-those who hate and want to destroy our society-leads to
abusive practices, which, while not as harsh as the tactics deployed against
those in the military prisons, are nonetheless troubling for the rule of law
and our moral fabric as a nation, as they have contributed to the creation
and reinforcement of a "culture of fear" in America. 2 "
Indeed, once we look at the wide scope of the post-9/1 1 security
apparatus, including immigration policies and other technologies of
surveillance285 implemented by the USA PATRIOT Act, 286 we see that the

284. Even former National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter, Zbigniew Brzezinski,
has decried what he calls the "fear-mongering reinforced by security entrepreneurs, the mass media
and the entertainment industry" in what has been "five years of almost continuous national
brainwashing on the subject of terror" leading to the creation of a "culture of fear," which he claims
"acquires a life of its own" and threatens to be "demoralizing." Zbigniew Brzezinski, Terrorized
by "War on Terror": How a Three-Word Mantra Has UnderminedAmerica, WASH. POST, Mar.
25, 2007, at BO. Brzezinski identifies "terror entrepreneurs," who he says are "usually described
as experts on terrorism," and as "necessarily engaged in competition to justify their existence." Id.
Accordingly, "their task is to convince the public that it faces new threats. That puts a premium on
the presentation of credible scenarios of ever-more-horrifying acts of violence, sometimes even
with blueprints for their implementation." Id. Brzezinski also highlights the entertainment
industry's contribution to a generalized "Islamophobia" through its portrayal of "evil characters"
with "recognizable Arab features." Id.
285. The Bush Administration's domestic spying program presents a case in point. President
Bush authorized the program, which was exposed in December 2005, to monitor the international
phone calls and e-mails of U.S. citizens, without first obtaining a court warrant. A federal judge
declared the program unconstitutional in August 2006, saying it violated rights to free speech and
privacy, and the separation of powers. See Jeannie Shawl, FederalJudge Rules Domestic Spy
Program Unconstitutional, JURIST, Aug. 17, 2006, available at http://jurist.law.
pitt.edu/paperchase/2006/08/breaking-news-federal-judge-rules.php. The Justice Department
appealed and a subsequent Sixth Circuit ruling determined that the program could continue as the
appeal was pending. See Alexis Uncovic, Federal Appeals Court Allows Domestic Spying to
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de-ethnicized version of the conniving claimant-a diffuse image of the
law and lawyers as undermining the social order through a litigation
explosion-has now been re-formulated287 as an enemy combatant.288
Recall that President Bush's Military Order of November 13, 2001, gave
the President wide authority to determine whether or not an individual was
an enemy combatant, including those who have "engaged in, aided or
abetted, or conspired to commit, acts of international terrorism, or acts in
preparation therefore, that have caused, threaten to cause, or have as their
aim to cause, injury to or adverse effects on the United States, its citizens,
national security, foreign policy, or economy .... 289
All the hateful attributes of the conniving claimant that had been
distributed and ascribed to the entire body politic during the tort reform
debates, 29° have now been concentrated and re-inscribed into the body of

Continue Pending Appeal, JURIST, Oct. 4, 2006, available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/
paperchase/2006/10/federal-appeals-court-allows-domestic.php.
The program has been so
controversial that one federal judge, U.S. District Judge James Robertson, resigned in protest over
its abuses in December 2005. See UneaseRises Over Domestic Spying, CBSNEWS.COM, Dec. 21,
2005, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/ 2005/12/21/politics/main 1150626.shtml. Reversing the
position of defending the policy it held for over a year, the Administration announced in January
2007 that it would begin to seek court approval for its surveillance. See Senators Grill Gonzalez
Over Spying Program, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 18, 2007; see also Administration to Let Court
MonitorDomesticSpying, CNN.com, Jan. 18,2007, http://www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/01/ 17/
domestic.spying/index.html. Notably, the program had been tapping 186 "anti-military protests or
demonstrations in the U.S.," as of February 10, 2006, according to an NSA memo procured through
a Freedom of Information Act request by the American Civil Liberties Union. See ACLU, No Real
Threat: The Pentagon'sSecret Databaseon PeacefulProtest,Jan. 17, 2007, http://www.aclu.org/
safefree/spyfiles/27988pub20070l17.html. This is a direct echo of President Nixon's domestic
surveillance of radical leftist political activists and the anti-war movement. The military, including
the CIA, has also been involved in domestic surveillance. See Eric Lichtblau & Mark Mazzeti,
MilitaryExpands Intelligence Role in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2007, at 1.
286. Recall the full title of the USA PATRIOT Act is the "Uniting and Strengthening America
by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001."
287. Recall that foreigners, particularly Jews, were the original stereotypical conniving
claimants. See discussion supra Part II.
288. See generally DAvID CoLE, ENEMY ALIENS 57-82 (2003) (stating in pertinent part that
the USA PATRIOT Act could extend to any and all aliens who lawfully reside in the United
States); see also Office of the Inspector General, Supplemental Report on Sept. 11 Detainees'
Allegations of Abuse at the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn, N.Y. (Dec. 2003),
availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0312/chapter5.htm#V. This report makes clear that
abusive behavior can be directed at "aliens" whether they are in Guantinamo, Abu Ghraib, or
Brooklyn. See id.
289. See Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, supra note 34.
290. Galanter writes, "[a]s the emphasis shift[s] from jokes about conniving claimants to
legends about outrageous claims and undeserved awards, the location of perceived abuse of the
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the enemy combatant and terrorist-those working secretly from within
our society to destroy it. As a result, after 9/11, Muslims, Arabs, and others
perceived to be either, have become targets.29' Noncitizens of certain
292
phenotypical and religious orientations are treated as presumed threats.
Others fitting these categories, including citizens, are perceived by their
fellow citizens as targets to whom they can legitimately respond with
vigilant justice, 293 and whom law enforcement
officials deem too
294
dangerous to be allowed to roam freely.
Most disturbingly, the enemy combatant metaphor has even broader
entailments. It now encompasses far more than its narrow legal definition,
including all those, as President Bush described just nine days after 9/11,
who "hate our freedoms" and want to "disrupt and end a way of life."'2 95 As
disturbing as Muslim and Arab profiling is, and as problematic as the
immigration detention policies became after 9/11, further intrusions into
the private sphere produced by the entailments of the enemy combatant
metaphor are even harder to explain from the perspective of deterring
terrorism. These include, among others, U.S. citizens who are political
dissidents against both U.S. policy, 296 and against other countries'

system is more general and diffuse, and the miscreants are not outsiders and strangers, but rather,
those who look like, and may be, us." Galanter, Conniving Claimant,supra note 63, at 665.
291. See, e.g., Neil Macfarquhar, Echoes of Terror Case Haunt CalifornianPakistanis,N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 27, 2007, at Al.
292. See Omar C. Jadwat, The Arbitrary Detention of Immigrants After September 11,
available at http://www.aclu.org/iclr/jadwat.pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 2007).
293. See Human Rights Watch, We Are Not the Enemy: Hate Crimes Against Arabs, Muslims,
and Those Perceived to be Arab or Muslim after September 11 (Nov. 2002), available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/usahate/.
294. See generally GREY, GHOST PLANE, supra note 22; see also Center for Constitutional
Rights, Docket: Arar v. Ashcroft, http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/legal/Septemberl Ith/Septl lArticle.
asp?ObjlD=zPvu7s2XVJ&Content=-377 (last visited Oct. 9,2007) (discussing Ararv. Ashcroft, 414
F. Supp. 2d 250 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), motion denied,2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45550 (E.D.N.Y. 2006)).
Maher Arar, a Canadian/Syrian citizen detained by INS in JFK airport, claims he was "rendered"
by U.S. officials to Syrian authorities to be tortured for eight months. Id. He subsequently received
several million dollars in compensation from the Canadian government following the finding of an
official commission of inquiry that found the government had been negligent in protecting him
while in U.S. custody. See In Depth: MaherArarTimeline, CBCNEwS, Jan. 26,2007, http://www.
cbc.ca/news/background/arar/. See also EI-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007),
cert. denied, E1-Masri v. United States, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 11351 (Oct. 9, 2007). EI-Masri is a
Kuwait-born German citizen who was detained from December 31,2003, through May 28, 2004,
in a CIA prison known as the "Salt Pit" in Afghanistan. See ExtraordinaryRendition, supra note
172.
295. President Bush, Address to Joint Session of Congress (Sept. 20, 2001).
296. See supra note 280 (discussing the U.S. government's illegal surveillance of peaceactivists). This political atmosphere is overly permissive of tactics that can far too easily be trained
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policies, 297 as well as non-U.S. citizens expressing views unpopular with
the U.S. government (and their own governments). 298 The spirit of this

on those undeserving of them, meaning that any unwanted political dissent can be construed as
terrorist activity. Consider, for example, the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (AET), which passed
the Senate in September 2006 with unanimous consent, and the House in November 2006 after a
voice vote taken under a suspension of rules. Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 43
(West 2006). While the bill primarily criminalizes violent protests and other acts by eco-terrorists,
activists argue that the law is "excessively broad and vague," and "imposes disproportionately harsh
punishment." Why Oppose AETA, EQUAL JUSTICE ALLIANCE, http://www.noaeta.com/
whyoppose.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2007). Activists in the Equal Justice Alliance, a 200-member
coalition formed to oppose the law, claim the law "brands animal advocates as 'terrorists' and
denies them equal protection under the law," "brands civil disobedience as 'terrorism' and imposes
severe penalties," "has a chilling effect on all forms of protest by endangering free speech and
assembly," "interferes with investigation of federal law violations by animal enterprises," and
"detracts from prosecution of real terrorism against the American people." Id. In particular, they
argue that there is room to interpret whether to ban more peaceful activities that result in "loss of
profits" for almost all "animal enterprises." Id.; see also Animal EnterpriseTerrorismAct Passes;
Bush Expectedto Sign, Nov. 12,2006, http://www.indybay.org/newsitems/2006/1 1/12/18329237.
php.
297. See Elaine Cassel, Is Playing Paintball and Firing Legal Guns Terrorism? Three
DisturbingConvictions Strongly Suggest DiscriminationAgainst Muslim Americans, FINDLAW,
Mar. 25, 2004, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/cassel/20040325. html. Three Muslim American men
(out of an initial batch of eleven) were convicted of aiding and abetting a terrorist organization,
thereby exposing them to sentencing of fifty to one hundred years. Id. Cassel notes that the United
States initially did not even see this case as a "terrorism" case; the charges initially brought were
under the Neutrality Act, which criminalizes "attacking" another country with which the United
States is at peace. Id.Cassel concludes that these prosecutions were arguably motivated by
"discrimination and a desire to send a message to Muslims, not out of concern for national security
or justice." Id. She adds, "[t]he prosecutorial strategy of 'Plead guilty or be labeled a terrorist' is
coercive, and wrong for our government to employ in any case, terrorism or no terrorism." Id.
298. The radical expansion of the law enforcement community's powers through the USA
PATRIOT Act has fostered the emergence of very broad categories of "terrorist." The Patriot Act
denies entry into the United States to anyone materially supporting a terrorist organization, which
is defined expansively as any group of two or more people who intend to kill or inflict harm upon
others. But according to documents released by the Freedom of Information Act, Homeland
Security officials have interpreted the Patriot Act so casually that anyone guilty of "irresponsible
expression of opinion" can be denied access to the United States. The ACLU reported that under
this guise of legitimate authority, the government has denied, revoked or delayed the granting of
visas to
a group of seventy-five South Korean farmers and trade unionists opposed to a
free-trade agreement; a Marxist Greek academic; a Sri Lankan hip-hop singer,
whose lyrics were deemed sympathetic to the Tamil Tigers and the Palestine
Liberation Organization; a Bolivian professor of Latin-American history ...; a
Basque historian; a former Sandinista minister of health; and nine thousand five
hundred Burmese refugees.
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invasion of the private sphere of legitimate activity has diffused
throughout society, even filtering down to local and state law enforcement
technologies of power and surveillance.299
Given Senator Graham's rhetoric about how the presence of detainees'
lawyers has obstructed the important intelligence work conducted at
Guantdnamo Bay, it is unsurprising that the expansive net of the enemy
combatant category has also started to catch these very lawyers within its
grasp. In turning its repressive tactics against lawyers, the enemy
combatant governmentality betrays its links to its metaphorical
predecessor, the conniving claimant, whose destructive activities were
facilitated by predator lawyers.
B. TargetingLawyers
As the previous section showed, the new metaphor of enemy combatant
has fast become a governmentality-a new paradigm for governance-in
the "War on Terrorism." The implications of this development are that the
already overly expansive definition of the enemy combatant has been
further expanded to the point that it is poised to overpower other legally
salient categories at the core of American government, most notably that
of citizen. With this overly-powerful tool in their hands, the government
has targeted even those who have not taken up arms or planned attacks
against the country, but have merely tried to support its long tradition of
respecting the rule of law by offering legal defense to those ensnared in the
enemy combatant trap.
1. Lynne Stewart
The Lynne Stewart case shook the legal world, as it presented troubling
issues about legal ethics and how lawyers should handle the new law

George Packer, Keep Out; GeorgePacker on Why Giving TariqRamadana Visa is in the National
Interest, NEW YORKER, Oct. 16, 2006, at 59. As Packer notes, there is an "apparent mixture of
deliberate ideological exclusion and blind bureaucratic stupidity" in these exclusions, which have
also dramatically affected the granting of access to refugees in large numbers. In 1992, the United
States admitted more than 130,000 political refugees, but at the time of reporting, only 41,500 of
60,000 slots for 2006 had been filled. Id. at 60. Among those refugees excluded were "anti-Castro
Cubans, Vietnamese and Laotian Montagnards, Liberians, Somalis, and Colombian peasants," for
whom the United States barred entry because of voluntary or coerced support of armed groups. Id.
299. See Jim Dwyer, City PolicySpied BroadlyBefore G.O.P. Convention, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
25, 2007, at Al (discussing covert operations by New York police's "R.N.C. Intelligence Squad,"
a team of officers who "attended meetings of political groups, posing as sympathizers or fellow
activists," across the country and in Europe, investigating various groups who planned to protest
the Republican National Convention in New York City in 2004).
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enforcement paradigm ushered in by the "War on Terrorism." It should be
emphasized that the case does not present a clear cut example of a
blameless lawyer meekly playing by the rules, whose innocent efforts the
government inexplicably and unjustly targeted. Immediately before her
sentencing to twenty-eight months in federal prison, Stewart
acknowledged as much, claiming responsibility for her wrongdoing, which
she claims grew in part out of misjudgments and naivet6 over how lawyers
defending terrorist clients must behave.30 0 Nonetheless, the case is
important because it demonstrates the government's new willingness in the
post-9/11 world to see the law and lawyers as enemy combatants.
Stewart was convicted in February 2005 for providing material support
to a terrorist conspiracy.3 ' The charges grew out of her representation of
Sheik Abdel-Rahman, a radical Islamic cleric from Egypt convicted for his
connection to the World Trade Center bombings in 1993. The government
claimed that Stewart lent support to Rahman and his followers by violating
her Special Administrative Measures (SAMs), a list of directives
established in October 2001 by General John Ashcroft to govern lawyers'
visitation of clients charged with, or convicted of, crimes of terrorism.
Under the SAMs, Stewarts' visits were subjected to surveillance and
recording, she was prohibited from discussing anything with Rahman other
than post-conviction representation issues, and she was also
proscribed
30 2
*from disclosing the content of their meetings to the press.
Stewart admitted to intentionally violating these directives by speaking
gibberish to confound the recording of conversations between Rahman and

300. Julia Preston, Lawyer in TerrorCaseApologizesforViolating SpecialPrisonRules, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 29,2006, availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/29/nyregion/29stewart.html?
ex=I 169874000&en=ac4b60b44157b379&ei=5070. Stewart wrote in a personal letter to thejudge
handling her sentencing: "My only motive.. . was to serve my client as his lawyer. What might
have been legitimately tolerated in 2000-2001, was after 9/11 interpreted differently and considered
criminal. At the time I didn't see this. I see and understand it now." Id. Stewart also acknowledged
lapses in judgment, admitting to being "na'fve in the sense that I was overly optimistic about what
I could and should accomplish as the sheik's lawyer." Id. Finally, and most importantly, Stewart
recognized belatedly the changed environment in which she had been operating, stating that she had
failed to understand that in representing a convicted terrorist she might need to "tread lightly," as
she had misjudged the prosecutors' zealous pursuit of her. Id.
301. See United States v. Sattar, 395 F. Supp. 2d 66, 69 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
302. See Elaine Cassel, The Cases of Lynne Stewart, Clive Stafford Smith, and Navy JAG
Lawyer Charles Swift: Government Retaliation Against Attorneys for Terrorism Suspects,
FINDLAW, Oct. 19, 2006, http://writ.lp.findlaw.com/cassel20061019.html. As Cassel notes, the
most damaging evidence against Stewart ended up coming not from SAMs-related surveillance,
but rather, from surveillance instituted by a warrant secured under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA), which had been in operation since 2000.
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the interpreter, Mohamed Yousry.3 °3 Yousry also wrote down messages
from Rahman and passed these on to Ahmed Abdel Sattar, a New York
postal worker associated with Sheik Rahman's Islamic Group.3" Sattar
allegedly then forwarded these messages to the Sheik's followers. °5
Finally, in a press release in 2000, Stewart said that the Sheik did not agree
to a cessation of the kind of terrorist violence with which the Islamic
Group had been associated.30 6 In addition to the attack on the World Trade
Center in 1993, terrorism is linked to the attack on the USS Cole on
October 12, 2000.307
The government argued that the intent of the press release was to
encourage the Sheik's followers to continue plotting and carrying out
terrorist attacks.308 Stewart countered that the SAMs were unconstitutional
prior restraints on her freedom of speech and on her client's right to
counsel under the Sixth Amendment.30 9 Judge Koeltl rejected her defense,
pointing out that Stewart could have used other means, such as seeking an
injunction against the SAMs rather than simply breaking them.3"'
The changed environment post-9/11 is evident from several elements
of Stewart's case, particularly the prosecutorial strategy that the
government pursued and the court's acceptance of it. As Elaine Cassel
observes, it is remarkable that there was a prosecution strategy at all. In
another era, Stewart merely would have suffered a professional reprimand
from the New York State Bar, and likely would not be disbarred.3 1 '
Instead, the government pursued Stewart as an enemy of the state for
having conspired with a terrorist.
The government's zest and the court's acquiescence are manifest in the
evidence presented. The government was able to introduce evidence
attempting to link Stewart and the Sheik to al-Qaida and 9/11, going so far
as closing their arguments with a videotape of Osama bin Laden, which
was all the more dramatic given the courthouse's close proximity to the
site of the World Trade Center attacks. As Cassel notes, this evidence "was
arguably highly prejudicial-and Judge Koelti may well have been wrong

303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Cassel, supra note 297.
307. Press Release, Department of Justice, Superseding Indictment Adds New Charges
Against Ahmed Abdel Sattar, Lynne Stewart, and Mohammed Yousry (Nov. 19, 2003),
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/November/03_crm631 .htm.
308. See id.
309. Cassel, supra note 297.
310. Id.
311. Id.

2007]

THE LA WAND LAWYERS AS ENEMY COMBA TANTS

to deem it admissible-for the government was not able credibly to
connect Stewart and her co-defendants' actions to 9/11.,"312
Finally, as if pursuing her as a terrorist was not enough, the prosecutor
also sought to punish Stewart with a thirty-year prison term. However,
Judge Koeltl would not grant this, but instead sentenced Stewart to only
twenty-eight months in prison in October 2006, citing her lifelong public
service in representing court-appointed criminal defendants, her poor
physical condition (Stewart is sixty-five and battling cancer and diabetes),
and the fact that no one was harmed by her actions.31 3 Though she scraped
by, Stewart's case illustrates how lawyers are no longer seen as the pillars
upon which our rule of law is balanced, but rather as obstructing the
nation's progress towards winning the "War on Terrorism." Unfortunately,
her case is not the only example.
2. Clive Stafford Smith
Clive Stafford Smith, a 27-year opponent of the death penalty in the
United States and the Legal Director of the UK-based anti-death penalty
advocacy organization Reprieve, took on a new cause in the wake of 9/11:
defending Guantdnamo detainees. In June 2006, three detainees committed
suicide: Manei Shaman Turki al-Habadi, 30, and Yasser Talal al-Zahrani,
21, both from Saudi Arabia, and Ali Abdullah Ahmed, 29, from Yemen.3 '4
Then commander of Guantinamo, Navy Rear Admiral Harry Harris,
alleged the suicides were not acts of desperation to alleviate suffering of
indefinite duration, but rather, were part of a conspiracy of organized
"asymmetric warfare."3 5 Lieutenant Commander Jeffrey Gordon, the
Pentagon's chief press officer, added that it was not necessary to mourn
the men's deaths, as all three men were dedicated terrorists: "These guys
were fanatics like the Nazis, Hitlerites, or the Ku Klux Klan, the people
they tried at Nuremberg. "316
More outrageously, the Department of Defense alleged that Clive
Stafford Smith organized the suicides. In an email to the Associated Press,
Smith recounted how Guantdnamo operatives interrogated his client,
37
Mohammed el Gharani, on a weekly basis following the suicides. ,
During this time, Gharani was "'repeatedly questioned about [Smith's]
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. See David Rose, How U.S. Hid the Suicide Secrets of Guantanamo,GUARDIAN, June 18,
2006, at 30.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Cassel, supra note 297.
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role in the suicides.' 318 Interrogators told Gharani that Smith had told his
other clients 'to kill themselves, and word was passed to the three men
who did commit suicide. ,,319 During the course of its investigation into the
suicides, the Navy seized over one thousand pages of detainee documents.
The documents included attorney-client materials and evidence to be used
in their defense before military tribunals, including affidavits from family
members that the detainees' lawyers obtained with great difficulty.32°
Given the allegations, it is possible that the government may pursue the
matter against Smith further, particularly because he and his organization
represent dozens of detainees. After all, in the Stewart case, in order to
establish that Stewart gave "material support to a terrorist conspiracy[]"
"'
the government merely had to establish that she carried messages.32
As of October 2007, the government has yet to pursue formal charges
against Stafford Smith, but they have continued to hold him in deep
suspicion: in late September 2007, Stafford Smith and his co-counsel,
Zachary Katznelson, were accused of smuggling contraband-in the form
of Speedo swimsuits and men's briefs-to their clients.322 Calling the
accusations, "patently absurd," Stafford Smith observed that his work
involves "legal briefs, not the other sort. '323 He further commented soberly
that, "'I cannot imagine who would want to give my client Speedos, or
why. Mr. Aamer is hardly in a position to go swimming, since the only
available water is the toilet in his cell."' 3 24 It is also unlikely that Mr.
Aamer would even have the strength to swim at all; he has been on
three hundred
multiple hunger strikes, including one that has lasted 3over
25
days and has left him at half his original body weight.

318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Raymond Bonner, A New Threat at Guantinamo:Smuggled Speedos and Briefs, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 29, 2007, at A5.
323. Id.
324. Candace Gorman, And Then There is the UnderwearStory, HUFFINGTON POST, Sept. 16,
2007, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/h-candace-gorman-/and-then-there-is-theund b 64613.html. Stafford Smith continued, in his response to the Government's letter, "Ishould
say that your letter brought to mind a sign in the changing room of a local swimming pool, which
showed someone diving into a lavatory, with the caption, "'We don't swim in your toilet, so please
don't pee in our pool.' I presume that nobody thinks that Mr. Aamer wears Speedos while paddling
in his privy[]." Id.
325. See Unclassified Statement of Shaker Aamer (Nov. 7, 2005), http://humanrights.
ucdavis.edu/projects/the-guantanamo-testimonials-project/testimonies/prisoner-testimonies/aamer_
statement original.pdf; see also Clive Stafford Smith, America's Legal Black Hole, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 5, 2007, at A27.
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What is also not a laughing matter are the ways in which the
Government has attempted to make legal representation of Guantfnamo
detainees an increasingly arduous task. To accomplish this, the
government applies pressure on both the detainees and the lawyers, which
strains the attorney-client relationship or makes the task of providing an
adequate defense nearly impossible. In spring 2007, the government filed
a protective order that contained a wish list of the terms and conditions
with which it wanted detainee lawyers to comply in their relationships
with their clients.326 In particular, the government tried to drastically
restrict the contact and communication between lawyers and their
Guantdnamo detainee clients by limiting the definition of "legal mail" and
by setting a three-visit limit on face-to-face meetings once a detainee had
agreed to be represented by a particular lawyer.3 27 The government has
also sought to institute censorship of all attorney-client communications.
This was necessary, the government argued, because lawyers' use of mail
to communicate with their clients had "'enabled detainees' counsel to
cause unrest on the base by informing detainees about terrorist
attacks[,]9" 328 by informing them about the situation in Iraq, activities of
various terrorist leaders, the Hezbollah war with Israel, and abuse of
prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. The New York City Bar
Association responded in a letter saying, "'[b]laming counsel for the
hunger strikes and other unrest is a continuation of a disreputable and
unwarranted smear campaign against counsel.' ' 329 The new protective
order has not yet been issued, but detainees' lawyers have had to sign
waivers stating that they agree to the new rules without prejudice to their
later challenge of these rules.33°
3. Lieutenant Commander Charles Swift
Lieutenant Commander Charles Swift was a career Navy JAG lawyer
who was ordered to represent Salim Hamdan. 33' Before it had filed formal
charges against Hamdan, the government informed Swift that he could

326. See Bismullah v. Rumsfeld, No. 06-1197,2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 31160 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(Protective Order and Procedures for Counsel Access to Detainee at the U.S. Naval Base in
GuantAnamo Bay, Cuba) (on file with author).
327. Bar Criticizes ProposedDetaineeRules, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2007, at A15.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. For a description of a lawyer's typical interactions with her clients, see H. Candace
Gorman, Inside the Secret Facility, IN THESE TIMES.COM, Oct. 2, 2007, available at http://www.
inthesetimes.com/article/3338/inside-the-secret-facility/.
331. Cassel, supranote 297.
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assist Hamdan only by negotiating a plea agreement for Hamdan.332 Swift
refused to see Hamdan until the government allowed him to mount a
defense. Following his successful defense of Hamdan, leading to the
Supreme Court's momentous ruling in Hamdanv. Rumsfeld, Swift's status
in the Navy was up for review.3 33 Though Swift's direct superior officer
had lauded him as among the finest lawyers in the military, the Navy
denied his promotion. Subject to regulations, which state that Swift must
either be promoted or retire, he has been forced to leave the Navy.
However, the Navy denies that Swift's forced retirement was retaliatory.
Swift continues to represent Hamdan as a civilian attorney in
conjunction with other attorneys.33 4 They have filed challenges to the
constitutionality of the Military Commissions Act (MCA), which passed
on October 17, 2006."'5 Significantly, the MCA's definition of unlawful
enemy combatants includes those who "purposefully and materially
'
supported hostilities against the United States or its co-belligerents. 336
This is an expansion of the traditional humanitarian law definition that
limits such persons to those who actively engaged in hostilities. In
addition, the MCA grants the President or Secretary of Defense unlimited
power to label anyone an unlawful enemy combatant.33 7 It remains unclear
how this bold new statutory construction will affect U.S. citizens because
they are not explicitly proscribed from inclusion in the definition.338

332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. See MCA, supra note 7.
337. See Joanne Mariner, The Military Commissions Act of2006: A Short Primer(PartOne
of a Two-Part Series), FINDLAW, Oct. 9, 2006 [hereinafter Mariner, Primer Part One],
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/mariner/20061009.html; see also The Military CommissionsAct of
2006: A Short Primer (PartTwo of a Two-PartSeries), FINDLAW, Oct. 25, 2006, http://writ.news.
findlaw.com/mariner/20061025.html; Michael C. Dorf, Why the Military Commissions Act is No
Moderate Compromise,FINDLAW, Oct. 11,2006, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20061011.html.
Aziz Huq, How The Military Commissions Act of 2006 Threatens Judicial Independence:
Attempting to Keep the CourtsOut of the Business of Geneva ConventionsEnforcement, FINDLAW,
Sept. 26, 2006, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/ 20060926_huq.html; Challengingthe
Military Commissions Act, JURIST, Oct. 4, 2006, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/hotline/2006/10/
challenging-military-commissions-act.php.
338. See Mariner, PrimerPartOne, supranote 337 (commenting "the definition of'unlawful
enemy combatant' is not limited to aliens (even though U.S. citizens cannot be tried by military
commissions, and are not covered by the bill's habeas-stripping provisions)").
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4. Law Firms-The New Terror Cells
Not all of the attacks on lawyers have come through overt action. As
noted above, Senator Graham publicly chastised civil and human rights
lawyers as disruptive to the interrogation strategies of the U.S. military in
Guantinamo Bay.3 39 Others have taken more subtle tones, echoing the
discursive strategy deployed by Senator Graham. The most audacious of
these incursions came from U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Detainee Affairs Charles "Cully" Stimson, who implied links between
many of America's leading corporate law firms and enemy combatants.34
As if channeling Senator Joseph McCarthy, Stimson read a list during
a nationally broadcast radio interview, of the names of firms that had
offered legal defense to Guant~namo Bay detainees.34' When asked about
the financing of the cases, Stimson replied:
Funding? It's not clear, is it? Some will maintain that they're doing
it out of the goodness of their heart-that they're doing it pro bono,
and I suspect they are .... Others are receiving monies from
who
3 42
knows where and I'd be curious to have them explain that.
Stimson did not offer evidence that any of the firms he mentioned
provided their services on anything other than a pro bono basis, and
certainly there is no evidence that the money came from illicit sources or
"'who knows where,"' implying some nefarious link to some unknown
evil.3 43 Shockingly, Stimson went on to suggest that should CEOs discover

339. See supra text accompanying note 248.
340. Editorial, Unveiled Threats: A Bush Appointee's Crude Gambit on Detainees' Legal
Rights, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 2007, at A18.
341.

Id.

342. See Kate Heneroty, DOD Official Slams US. Law Firms for Defending Guantdnamo
Detainees,JURIST, Jan. 12,2007, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2007/0 1/dod-official-slamsus-law-firms-for.php; Audio tape: Federal News Radio Interviewing Cully Stimson, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (Jan. 2007)[hereinafter Stimson Interview]
(regarding the fifth anniversary of and what has changed most at Guantinamo),
http://federalnewsradio.com/emedia/59677.wma. Shortly thereafter, Stimson retracted his
comments and apologized after receiving tremendous criticism from lawyers representing some of
the detainees (many of whom suggested he should be fired for his comments), and others, including
the American Bar Association and 130 U.S. law school deans. The Pentagon distanced itself from
Stimson's comments, saying Stimson's comments did not "represent the views of the Defense
Department or the thinking of its leadership." See Bernard Hibbits, Stimson Apologizes to Detainee
Lawyers for GuantdnamoRepresentation Comments, JURIST, Jan. 17, 2007, http://jurist.law.pitt.
edu/paperchase/2007/01/stimson-apologizes-to-detainee-lawyers.php.
343. Editorial,supranote 340.
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that their companies are being represented by law firms which also
represent the "very terrorists who hit their bottom line back in 2001," the
CEOs should "make those law firms choose between representing
terrorists or representing reputable firms." 3"
These comments employ rhetorical strategies aimed at keeping the
mythical jaundiced view of the law alive. Like the mythical conniving
claimant's supposedly paralyzing effects on the productive forces in our
economy, its successor image, the enemy combatant, encompasses the
same fear of an anemic economy and a withering national strength. The
newer image draws its legitmacy from its predecessor. Now, more than
weakening the national defense against the terrorists by interrupting
interrogations or trying to free terrorists, the enemy combatants are
launching direct attacks on the economy. In typically dramatic fashion,
The NationalReview refers to this as "lawfare," the "use of the American
'
people's courts as a weapon against the American people."345
After an immediate backlash of criticism, Stimson quickly apologized
and Department of Defense officials distanced themselves from his
comments, leading to his resignation.346 Still, his deployment of the
jaundiced view of the law achieved its objective; the metaphorical cat was
out of the bag, free to roam about and interact with the earlier gestalts of
the conniving claimant. The power of this example should not be
underestimated. With this attack on law firms, more marginalized
members of the bar such as criminal defense lawyers and nonprofit
activists are no longer alone in being painted as the enemy; societal elites
have become enemy combatants too. This is not a case of politics-makingstrange-bedfellows. Rather, it is an instance of a powerful ideology run
amok, producing consequences unforeseen by the people who created it.
VII. CONCLUSION: THE "NEAR ENEMY" AND THE "FAR ENEMY"

This Article has grappled with Congress's acquiescence in the face of
the Executive's prosecution of the "War on Terrorism," despite the
abusive practices that this approach has entailed. Rather than challenge
these practices, Congress squandered its opportunity to inject reason into
our national policies, and instead, merely bolstered the Executive's stance,

344. Stimson Interview, supra note 342.
345. Andrew C. McCarthy, Lawfare Strikes Again, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, June 12, 2007,
http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=YWVIMGZIMzJhN2EwMWUOYjIzZjkwOGRIOTBIY2Ux

YTQ=.
346. See supra note 342 and accompanying text.
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first with the passage of the DTA, an effective legislative override of Rasul
v. Bush, and later and more devastatingly, with the MCA, a reaction to the
Supreme Court's decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.34 7
More conventional approaches may have told this story somewhat
differently, highlighting the battles between the coordinate branches as the
main dramatic narrative. Conventional political science might have tracked
the shrinking and growing "decision spaces" of the various branches vis-4vis the others, to demonstrate how they have kept one another in check
over time.34 8 This more condensed Guantdnamo narrative would also fit
comfortably with a much longer decades-long struggle between
conservatives and liberals over the relative authority of the executive and
judicial branches.
Indeed, as discussed above, a major component of the jaundiced view
of the law paradigm, as introduced by conservatives into popular cultural
discourse, has been an effort to fortify and augment the powers of the
executive branch. Their efforts have promoted the notion of the "unitary
executive," while attacking the judiciary and its "liberal [activist]
judges.349 According to this view, judges have "gone too far" in injecting
their own liberal "social and economic ideas" into their decisionmaking
and in "weakening the peace forces as against the criminal force in [the]
country."35 So, when President Bush declared in 2005 that he had the legal
authority to conduct domestic surveillance on Americans despite the clear
restrictions on such activity by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act

347. Though in the debates over the MCA, a handful of senators, including Senator Graham,
clashed with the Executive over the Administration's attempts to redefine Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions within the legislation. 151 CONG. REC. S12,655 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 2005)
(statement of Sen. Graham).
348. See generally JED BARNES, OVERRULED? LEGISLATIVE OVERRIDES, PLURALISM, AND
CONTEMPORARY COURT-CONGRESS RELATIONS (2004); TERRI PERETTI, IN DEFENSE OF A

POLITICAL COURT (1999).
349. See supra note 105; see also Reagan Justice Department Office of Legal Policy,
Guidelines on Constitutional Litigation (1988),
available at http://www.
americanconstitutionsociety.org/pdf/guidelines.pdf; see also QUIET REVOLUTION (Alliance for
Justice 2006); HERMAN SCHWARTZ, RIGHT WING JUSTICE: THE CONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN TO TAKE

OVER THE COURTS (2004); David Cole, The Dictator Defense, SALON, Feb. 10, 2006,
http://www.salon.com/opinion/feature/2006/02/l 0/dictator/print.html. Of course, as many have ably

demonstrated, the Rehnquist court was arguably the most activist court in U.S. history, when
viewed from the perspective of its rate of invalidating federal laws. Since 1995, the Court struck
down thirty-five federal protections. See QUIET REVOLUTION, supra; see also CASS SUNSTEIN,
RADICALS IN ROBES (2005).

350. Robert A. Kagan, What if Abe Fortas had been More Discreet?, in WHAT IF?
EXPLORATIONS IN SOCIAL SCIENCE FICTION (Nelson Polsby ed., 1982) (Lewis Publ'g 1983)
(quoting statements of President Nixon).
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(FISA),351 he appeared to be channeling President Nixon's declaration that
"[w]hen the president does it that means that it is not illegal. 352
Furthermore, in the contemporary round of these battles, the real
showdown has indeed occurred between the Executive and the U.S.
Supreme Court, which has time and again stood up to the Bush
Administration's efforts to augment its own powers, invalidating some or
all of its arguments over the past few years of litigation on the "War on
Terrorism." Analyzing this battle as simply a separation of powers issue,
however, fails to address the persistent cultural mythologies about the law
that will remain in place, regardless of which branch can claim victory at
the end of the day. To understand why we ended up with the DTA, and
now the MCA, I have suggested that we look elsewhere: deep into our
cultural understanding of the law.
This approach is buttressed by examining the effects of the words of
those against whom "we" (the collective body politic) are at war. A
structural similarity confronts us when we compare Osama bin Laden's
bombastic prophecies and theological constructions with the ideologies of
those elements within our society that promote the jaundiced view of the
law. Both have seized upon traditions and perverted them, projecting in
their stead all-encompassing worldviews that have been adopted by other
people as lenses through which to make meaning of, and interact in,
political life-sometimes to disastrous results.
Substance aside, bin Laden's rhetorical strategy bears a structural
similarity to the rhetoric employed by Graham and the Bush
Administration that is difficult to ignore. Though its promotion of violent
struggle to achieve social and political objectives must be condemned
unequivocally, bin Laden's message needs to be appreciated for what it is.
Bin Laden seized upon a very marginal view-the one emphasized by
Salafi teachings-of the concept of jihad, or struggle in the cause of
God.3 53 Bin Laden's holy war perverted the Salafi value system. Though

351. See President's Radio Address (White House Radio Broadcast Dec. 17, 2005),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051217.html.
352. See Nixon's Views on Presidential Power: Excerpts from an Interview with David Frost,
May 19, 1977, http://www.landmarkcases.org/nixon/nixonview.html. It was the abusive domestic
intelligence gathering tactics under Nixon that prompted Congress to enact FISA in the first place.
Recall that the Huston Plan, unearthed during the Watergate scandal, was an effort not to battle
foreign forces, but to have greater leeway in surveillance of left-wing radicals and the anti-war
movement. See generally S. REP. No. 94-755 (1976) (discussing the Huston Plan).
353. There are in fact four schools ofjurisprudential thought with Sunni Islam, each with its
own views onjihad. The Salafi school, also known as the Wahhabi school, claims to base its radical
views on the teachings of the Hanbali school. Salafism emerged in Arabia as both a religious and
political movement responding to the decline of the Ottoman empire and the increasing strength
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jihad and military conquest have been central to the expansion of Islam
throughout the centuries, 354 even Salafi teachings have traditionally
proscribed attacks against those who cannot defend themselves. Salafi
thought forbids attacks on "women, children, monks, old people, the blind,
handicapped and their likes... [,]" unless "they actually fight with words
(e.g. by propaganda) and acts (e.g., by spying or otherwise assisting in the
warfare)., 355 Yet, bin Laden's entire strategy is to attack innocent civilians,
almost to the exclusion of all military targets. In popularizing this
paradigm of jihad, and prescribing it as a solution to the current
geopolitical situation, bin Laden successfully established an experiential
gestalt for how people who follow him have come to understand their daily
reality.
Here we see the structural similarities between the composition of the
jaundiced view and bin Laden's gestalt of jihad. Like the myths of
conniving claimants and predator lawyers, what matters is not whether this
paradigm is or ever was well-tethered to reality. The media's attention to
bin Laden's rhetorical strategies and selective presentation of facts give
him the opportunity to engage individuals throughout the world,
encouraging them to put faith in his paradigm for interpreting world
events. Further, once people become jihadists within bin Laden's
conception of the term, they learn to use this lens to interpret their reality
independent of bin Laden's direct instructions and explanations.
In this way, bin Laden's followers have become habituated to
construing in a negative light every action of the American government,
its allies, secular nation-states everywhere, and even those of Islamic
countries that bin Laden deems unholy. In short, jihad has become a
of Shi'a in Iran in the mid-18th century. See Bulend Shanay, Islam, in OVERVIEW OF WORLD
RELIGIONS (Division of Religion and Philosophy, St. Martin's College, Lancaster University),
availableat http://philtar.ucsm.ac.uk/encyclopedia/islam/sunni/wahha.html (last visited Nov. 14,
2007). Collectively, Islamic thought has produced five distinct variations of how jihad can be
waged. These includejihadbinnafs/qalb-jihadofthe heart/soul, i.e., apersonal spiritual struggle;
jihadbil lisan-jihadbythe tongue, i.e., writing and speech against evil;jihadbil qalam/ilm-jihad
through pen and knowledge, i.e., through scholarly study of Islam and through the sciences;jihad
bilyad-jihadby the hand, i.e., through acts of charity; andjihadbis saif-jihadby the sword, i.e.,
through holy war. See Wikipedia, Jihad, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Jihad#_ref-2 (giving the
usage of the term, classifications, and its links to warfare) (as of July 17, 2007, 8:20 EST).
354. See generally EFRAIM KARSH, ISLAMIC IMPERIALISM (2005).
355. See Wikipedia, Opinion of Islamic Scholars on Jihad, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Opinion of Islamicscholars on Jihad (presenting opinions of different scholars onjihad) (as of
July 17, 2007, 8:25 EST). This is the view popularized by 14th century scholar Ibn Taymiya, a
Hanbali jurist, whose views are generally not accepted or even recognized among mainstream
Muslims although they are quite popular with those in the Salafi movement that started in 20th
century Egypt, like the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Qaida. Id.
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governmentality through which these individuals-who compromise a
disaggregated, globally distributed "body politic"--make meaning out of
their political existences and respond to world events. According to Mark
Danner, this is the scariest aspect of our post-9/1 1world. We have entered
the "era of amateurs," wherein "Al Qaeda, in the form we knew it, has
been subsumed into the broader, more diffuse political world of radical
Salafi politics."356 Al-Qaida's network now runs itself from the bottom-up,
and the next attack will likely originate not with "veteran Qaeda planners,"
but from "this new wave of amateurs: viral Al Qaeda, political
sympathizers who nourish themselves on Salafi rhetoric and bin Laden
speeches 35and
draw what training they require from their computer
7
screens."
Bin Laden's successful use of metaphors and experiential gestalts
provides a stark and threatening demonstration of the destructive power of
rhetoric in social discourse. As this Article has shown, the deep structures
of the conniving claimant-turn-enemy combatant are very salient
metaphors in our culture; so salient that the enemy combatant may have
ascended to the heights of a new governmentality in the post-9/1 1 world.
This governmentality, not unlike the McCarthyist response to the "red
scare," creates harsh borders between those who support "American
values" and are deserving of rights, and those who are perceived to not
fully support the United States or its citizenry's way of life and are
therefore undeserving of such protections. Before the enemy combatant
hijacked political discourse, rights flowed from the government's contract
with the governed to uphold the U.S. Constitution. This contract has been
replaced by an emotive, supra-patriotism wherein the contract is not
between the government and the governed, but between the government
and a group of like-minded, right-thinking people. Senator Graham
effectively deployed this "in group" versus "out group" mentality,
threatening his fellow legislators with the rhetorical question:
Do you want to be the Senator who has changed 200 years of law?
Do you want to be the Senator who is changing the law of armed
conflict to say that an enemy combatant-someone caught on the
battlefield, engaged in hostilities against this country-is not a
person in a war but a criminal
and given the same rights as every
358
other American citizen?

356. See Danner, supra note 44.
357. Id.
358. 151 CONG. REC. S12,662-63 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Graham).
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In doing so, he drew upon the pervasive conservative jibe against "liberal
[activist] judges" who, in President Reagan's words, "make up the law."3'59
Like Reagan who perpetuated the myth about the psychic and the CAT
scan, 3" Graham simply lied about the historical precedent of Quirin and
Yamashita, thereby demonstrating that he had not read Justice Murphy's
dissent in that case.3 6'
One person who had read Yamashita, and presented Justice Murphy's
dissent in a letter to Senator Bingaman to rebut Senator Graham's
arguments, was Colonel Dwight H. Sullivan, the Chief Defense Counsel
of the Office of Military Commissions-the office established to oversee
the work of the commissions that will try enemy combatants for violating
the laws of war.3 62 Justice Murphy's argument strikes the proper balance
that the U.S. Supreme Court found again in Rasul, affirming the tradition
"in this country at least, that illegal restraints are unauthorized and
unjustified by any foreign policy of the Government and that commonly
accepted juridical standards are to be recognized and enforced. 36 3
Contrary to his bombastic claims, Senator Graham's Amendment sought
to disrupt that balance.
While Sullivan's courageous letter to Senator Bingaman offers some
solace, Senator Graham succeeded in erasing the true history of habeas
corpus in times of war, promoting the view that the Rasul decision, not
Graham's Amendment, was the perversion ofjustice, fairness, and the rule
of law at the backbone of our legal tradition. Indeed, there is great irony
and grave danger in the jaundiced view of the law. Once let loose, these
interrelated cultural myths about the law and lawyers ramble through the
popular imagination without boundaries. The profound irony is that the
enemy combatant paradigm renders law itself and lawyers as the tools and
technologies of power used to attack themselves and society in some kind
of perverse cannibalism. These observations lead us to the troubling
question of whether we can combat the jaundiced view of the law, or
whether it has become so natural that we have forgotten that it is a
perversion of our founding values.
The myths of conniving claimants, predator lawyers, and the flood of
litigation over unmeritorious claims encourage the notion that Americans
are constantly under attack by outsiders living among us who seek to cheat

359. See supranote 105.
360. See supratext accompanying notes 85-89.
361. See supratext accompanying note 263 (quoting Justice Murphy dissent in Yamashita).
362. See Sullivan Letter, supra note 262.
363. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 30 (1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting), quoted in Sullivan
Letter, supranote 262.
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our system or to take advantage of the rights that we have foolishly and
overgenerously extended them. Have these myths become foundational
knowledge to our consciousness as citizens? Have we come to the point
where we are content that the "rule of law" should be selectively applied
only to those who we feel do not oppose or threaten certain aspects of our
way of life? If so, who gets to make this subjective determination? Are we
really satisfied that, as stipulated in the MCA, which the D.C. Circuit
deemed constitutional in February 2007, the President and Secretary of
Defense can alone dictate who among us are enemy combatants? Has the
new govemmentality of enemy combatant, building on these entrenched
paradigms of thought in our country, really become our new mode of
politics? Have we regressed to a McCarthyist state, where, even in the
halls of Congress, senators cower at the possibility of being the one
legislator "who has changed 200 years of law," thereby giving comfort to
the enemy?
The answer to these questions, for better or worse, is contingent upon
each of us. In the context of the long history of attacks on the rule of law
and our basic notions of fairness, the extreme and misleading rhetoric
advocating the restrictive measures of the DTA is far from exceptional.
The terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the response they engendered have
fundamentally changed American life, necessitating new, careful
compromises between our freedom and our security. However, the war
that we find ourselves in is not a forever war simply because that is how
long it could take to neutralize the threat of al-Qaida, or because President
Bush has declared that this new crusade will have a potentially indefinite
duration."4 Rather, it is important to understand that we were caught in a
"forever war" long before the tragedy of 9/11, and that it is a forever war
because we cannot afford to ever stop waging it.
To explain, I turn again to Bin Laden's predictions. Bin Laden
prophesied a global conflict in two stages: first, a battle against the "near
enemy," the secularized, apostate Middle Eastern states who have
welcomed the United States' financial and military support, as well as
aspects of its culture, into their borders, thereby desecrating holy soil. The
second, more protracted war would be waged against the "far enemy," the
United States. As some have argued, the Bush Administration hastened
these prophecies into reality by invading Afghanistan and Iraq.365

364. President Bush was quoted as saying "'This is a new kind of evil' ...
'and we
understand ... this crusade, this war on terrorism, is going to take a while."' See Danner, supra
note 44.
365. See id.; see also FARwAZ A. GERGES, THE FAR ENEMY: WHY JIHAD WENT GLOBAL

(2005).
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Americans also have a "near enemy" and a "far enemy." Our forever
war is one in which our core values-the rule of law, liberty, and
democracy-are threatened most immediately and most profoundly by the
proliferation of the jaundiced view of the law and those willing to promote
it. Our far enemy might be al-Qaida and its impersonators; however, our
near enemy is not the enemy combatant whom we have learned to fear but
the jaundiced view of the law and its sympathizers.
Yes, the threat of terrorism adds urgency and uncertainty to our daily
struggle to live free lives, but we cannot win the long war against the far
enemy without prevailing in the immediate war with the near enemy. If we
ever forget this basic fact of our political existence and fail to remain
vigilant, like Justice Murphy once was, or how Colonel Sullivan,
Commander Swift, Clive Stafford Smith, and countless others have proven
to be, we too may find ourselves, like so many enemy combatants, in a
tomb-like 9.5 x 5.5 foot cell, waiting for word that a court will finally give
audience to our cries.
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